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Introduction
A comparative study can be conducted on either a macro-comparative or a micro-
comparative scale. In the former, two different systems are compared; in the latter,
specific legal institutes can be compared.' In comparing different legal systems it is
important to note how a legal system deals with the sources of the law, how these sources
are codified, and how this system deals with dispute resolutions.
It is impossible to describe a legal institution in a country without having a
general understanding of the basic principles of law that rules a particular system.
But an important factor that hampers an adequate comparison is the language
barrier. Some concepts cannot be easily translated. This can be due to the fact that there
is no existing translation. But a much more complicated problem is the existence of an
equivalent word in the other language, which has a different legal meaning. Once again,
it shows the necessity of not merely "translating" two institutions, but of "'immersing" in
the other legal system. Only then, will one become aware of the shortcomings of
translating dictionaries, be they legal dictionaries or not. The only way to overcome this
problem is to describe, rather than to translate the term.
The legal status of the teacher refers to his life both inside and outside the
classroom. The most obvious part of his job is teaching, which consists of the passing of
knowledge to his students. Yet before he enters the classroom, there are issues to be
resolved. For instance, the nature of the employment contract must be determined. Since
job security is a substantial matter, the teacher needs to know whether the employment
2contract is at will." If it is not an at-will contract, the reasons for dismissal should be
clearly established. The teacher also will be concerned about the prospect of tenure and
its conditions.
Inside the classroom, other legal issues may arise: what potential liability is there
with respect to the children and to what extent can the school control the teacher's private
life? The teacher must set an example for the students. As such, must the teacher's life
be at all times irreproachable? What is the standard? Can the school regulate the
teacher's speech? These issues may vary according to where the teacher works.
An interesting question is whether all the teachers of the world face the same
problems in their job. Is the duality of two competing school systems present in all
countries? In order to compare two different countries, it is important to determine the
organization of the school system, the contract of the teacher, and the sources of law
governing education and teachers.
This paper will examine both public and private schools in the United States and
Belgium. Particular attention will be paid to the status of teachers in both types of
schools in both countries. In Belgium, the tort liability of the teacher is different from
that in the U.S.
'
1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT AND HEIN KOETZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 5 (North Holland
1977).
" In private schools, the basic employment contract is at-will. It refers to a contract without a specific
duration or term. The rule means that a person can be fired for a good or a bad reason, that he even may be
fired in the absence of a reason, except for Title VII or the PDA. Since the relationship between the parties
is governed by contract, except for the erosions of the at-will doctrine, such as public policy, or tortious
interference of the discharge, all the provisions concerning the promotion or the denial and the termination
of the contract, must be stipulated. It is also possible that they figure in an employment manual. See
Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291 (1936); Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community School
Dist., 577 N.W.2d 845 (1998); Estes v. Lewis and Clark College. 152 Or. App. 372 (1998).
Chapter 1. 1 he United States
A. Brief historical overview
Historically, the federal Constitution did not specifically pertain to education.' At
the time the Constitution was written, no general awareness existed that education was
necessary regardless of class or wealth."^ "'[FJree and universal education was far beyond
the eye of the most progressive leaders".^ Influenced by revolutionary ideas coming
from England, the interest in an education in the United States grew. Although in
England under the Industrial Revolution a general education was not the top priority, on
the European continent, other countries were more progressive in realizing of the value of
education.^ Shortly after the United States gained its independence, the value of
education began to be realized. People began to see that education could unify the states
and build the foundation of the ideas of the American independence, such as freedom and
democracy. Although the U.S. Constitution does not provide a general clause for
education, all fifty state constitutions do.
^ See V. James Santaniello, School Law: a Legacy ofthe Twentieth Century 46 R. I. B. J. 5.
* 5ee KERN ALEXANDER AND M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW, 19 (West 3"* Ed.).
Ud.at 19.
*" Actually, Belgium, since its creation in 1830 does not belong to those countries. The compulsory school
attendance exists but after W. W: 1. See Els Witte, PoLiTiEKE Geschiedenis van Belgie [Political
History OF Belgium], (VUB Press ed.) (1998) [hereinafter Political History of Belgium].
^ Hartzell v. Connell, 35 Cal. 3d 899. 908 (1984); Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
* The first education law was the Massachusetts Statute of 1647 (MASSACHUSETTS COLONY LAWS and
Statutes, Ch. 88 (1647)). Although the colonial period produced a beginning of the American system of
public education, it was not until 1820 that a movement for public schooling began. Yet after the
independence of the United States, a number of states incorporated provisions about public education in
their respective constitutions. Pennsylvania adopted in 1 776 a rather vague educational clause in its
constitution. About 1790, Georgia and Delaware adopted educational provisions in its constitutions as
well. Yet it took until the late nineteenth Century and the early twentieth Century to make education
compulsory and free for all students. See HARRY G. GOOD AND James D. TELLER. A HISTORY OF
American Education, 83 (MacMillan 3"^ Ed). Today, the Constitution of Connecticut provides:" There
shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state." Ct. Const. Art. 8, § 1 . In
Colorado the provision goes as following:" The general assembly shall, ... provide for the establishment
3
4It was not only the states that realized the value of education. Traditionally.
churches have provided education as well. As the interest in education grew, the
nineteenth century became a decade of struggle between those who advocated a public
school and those who advocated church instituted schools. Gradually states accepted the
idea that education had to be organized, not only by private institutions, but also by the
state. This theorv' was reflected by the state courts, which often held that society was
served by a good education organized by the state.
One of the consequences of this struggle is that in the United States, public
schools as well as private schools exist side by side.' Since education as such is not
stipulated in any specific article of the U.S. Constitution, the responsibility for the
creation of a public school system remains in the realm of the states. Yet the
Constitution does provide a basis for the public school system. The law regulating
education is complex. There are federal statutes, rules, regulations and case law. as well
as state law. The laws are intertwined.'" But it is the States that have far reaching
authority in the regulation of the private schools.
and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free pubhc schools throughout the
state. ..gratuitously". Co CONST. Art. 9, § 2. Rhode Island provides in its constitution: "... [l]t shall be the
duty of the general assembly to promote public schools..." Rl. CONST. Art. 12, § 1.
This struggle did not only take place in the United States but also in Belgium, supra Chapter II. See
Kern Alexander and M. David Alex.4nder, American Public School Law 2 1 (West V^ Ed.) and
Els Witte, Political History of Belgium (VUB Press Ed.) (1998). The landmark case for the United States
is Pierce v. Society ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
'" In Leeper v. State, 53 S.W. 962 (1899) the court held "[t]he contribution of education to democracy has a
political, an economical, and a social dimension".
"5ee 268 U.S. 510(1925).
• t
- • <
.V
B. Sources of law
1
.
Federal Law
Congress has enacted statutes that specifically regulate school law.'"' Under the
threat of cutting back the funding. Congress is able to impose its rules. ''^ In addition,
other statutes, not specifically enacted with schools or teachers in mind, such as non-
discrimination rules, sex discrimination, pregnancy protection, safety on the work place,
have nevertheless had an impact on the status of teachers.'"^
Moreover, an important amount of school law consists of First Amendment
claims - free speech and the separation of state, in the form of schools, and church.
2. State Law
State constitutions all contain clauses related to education.'^ While the language
may vary from constitution to constitution, they all have underlying principles in
common. Public schools are a unit, a system of free education and unlimited access
guaranteed by the legislatures.' Yet the school systems differ from state to state. In
every state, the state legislature is responsible for the creation of the public school
system. The legislature is authorized to enact statutes, administrative regulations or
orders, and to create agencies that have delegated powers. Although state courts are an
'- H. C. HUDGINGS, JR. & RlCRARD S. VaCCA, LAW AND EDUCATION, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND COURT
Decisions 25 - 55 (The Michie Company 3 rd Ed.).
'' An example of the impact of Congress over the State's education is The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (20 U.S.C. § 1401 et. seq.) which charges the States to provide a free public education for all
handicapped children. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g)
protects the confidentiality of student records by unauthorized parties. The Elementary and Secondary
Education Act ( 20 U.S.C. § 2701 et. Seq.) is another example of the influence at the federal level on the
state's school system. This statute is one of the most sweeping attempts at the federal level to provide
federal aid to the elementary and secondary schools. It provides federal funds to local educational agencies
for educationally deprived children who reside in low-income areas. The types of grants are fixed by the
statute, but the amount is set yearly by Congress.
'"* See Michael W. LaMorte, School Law Cases and Concepts 10 (Allyn and Bacon ed. 6"" ed.)
(1998), see also Chapter II, section D of this paper for the Belgian part.
'" Title VII, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, American with Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.
6important source of education law as well, it seems that plaintiffs generally, when ii is
possible, prefer to choose the federal forum in educational matters.
C. Private schools
1 . Constitutional Right
For those not satisfied with that state public education, there is private education.
Citizens have a constitutional right to create private schools and it would be a violation of
the U.S. Constitution if the state were to prevent the establishment of private schools by
imposing a monopoly over education. This principle was confirmed in Pierce v. Society
ofSisters^^, where the Supreme Court held that no statute could denigrate a parents"
choice of school. It would "unreasonably interfere [ ] with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control".""
According to the Court there is a "fundamental liberty" that "excludes any general power
of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only"."' This case is often referred to as establishing the right of parents to
choose the most appropriate education of their children. This liberty of freedom of
choice of the parents embraces also that they can have their children instructed at home.""
The state legislature may control private education by setting the minimum standards of
attendance, content of the curriculum, length of education, etc. Pierce held that
compulsory school attendance, as regulated by statute is legitimate.
^''See note 8.
'^ KERN Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School Law 27 (West 3"* Ed.).
'* Michael W. LaMorte, School Law Cases and Concepts 13, 14 (Allyn and Bacon ed. 6"" ed.)
(1998), see Richard Fossey and Todd A. DeMitchell, "Let the Master Answer ": Holding Schools
Vicariously Liable When Employees Sexually Abuse Children 25 J. OF L. & EDUC. 574, 577 (1996).
'^268 U.S. 510(1925).
-°
Id. at 534.
-'W. at 510.
2. School Attendance
While Pierce provides the basis of the right to choose the type of education,
parents may not choose not educate their children. The states may compel parents to
send their children to a school, be it public or private, or to educate them at home through
accredited home instruction. Even Amish parents, allowed to remove their children, who
would otherwise be subject to compulsory attendance laws from school, can do this only
after the eight grade.""'
It is legitimate for the state to require that the private school or the home
instruction meet certain minimum standards. For instance the state could require that
private schools all provide professional teachers. It could also require the parents who
prefer home instruction to provide a professional teacher, or that the parents give some
proof of substantial education, or even that the students pass state tests." Case law also
establishes that home instruction is not an absolute right. ""^ Pierce may establish the right
to freedom of school choice, but it established no such right to home instruction.
Whenever parents fail to meet the standards and are compelled to send their children to
school, whether private or public, courts seem to accept that the state's interest in an
appropriate education for its children outweighs the interests of the parents."^
-- People V. Levisen, 404 111. 574 (1950); Jeffer>' v. O" Donnel. 702 F. Supp.513 ( 1987).
-' Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (1987).
-^ See New Jersey v. Massa. 95 N.J. Super. 382 (1967); Grigg v. Virginia, 224 Va. 356 (1982).
"^ If home instruction is understood as the instruction of a child at home by its parents, it is not an absolute
right. In Burrow v. State, 282 Ark. 479 (1984). the court held that home instruction by a parent is not a
compliance with a compulsory attendance statute. Moreover, some states may require prior approval by
state officials before a home school can replace public school attendance. See State v. McDonough, 468
A.2d 977 (1983); Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. 324 (1987); State v. Schmidt. 29 Ohio St. 3d
32 (1987); Matter of Kilroy, 121 Misc.2d 98 (1983).
-^Michael W. LaMorte, School Law Cases and Concepts 23 (Allyn and Bacon ed. 6'^ ed.) (1998).
3. Minimal Requirements
Moreover, Pierce did not shelter the non-public school from control hy the state.
It is completely legitimate for a state to organize some form of control in order to have
minimum requirements met. The question is what is the extent of the control.
Occasionally, the state's interest in quality education may conflict with the private school
views of their purpose. This could result in onerous burdens being imposed on the
private schools.
The Supreme Court never defined the parameters of state control. It defined the
federal government's compelling interest in Wisconsin v. Yoder,' without indicating the
boundaries of the statutory regulations of the state. But the interests of the state do not
always match the interests of the private schools, especially when it comes to teacher
certification."^
The absence of clear rules set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court also led to a vast
array of varying state judicial decisions. However, some common principles can be
drawn. First, as long as the state does not interfere with the religious orientation of the
school, the control seems legitimate. In other words, when there is no unreasonable
interference with the parties' right of free exercise of religion and the control is justified
by a compelling interest, the state can exercise its control."^ Second, when the action is
"one of the least restrictive means" to accomplish the state's interest in safeguarding a
good education. Once again, the extent of the control is a state matter, but control over
the curriculum, the attendance, the course materials, and the certification of the teacher
will be common themes in every state. Third, states exercise some form of control in
-'406 U.S. 205(1972)
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Emerging Legal Issues in Nonpublic Education 83 Ed.Law Rep. 1.10 (1993).
order to have the private school meet certain quahty standards. This is absolutely
legitimate, as long as the restrictions do not interfere with the religious or non-religious
project of the school. The state might thus require minimum degree requirements,
minimum hours of classes to be followed, and minimum number of days for attendance;
even the number of holidays may be fixed by the state. But a more delicate question is
whether the state may proscribe which days of the week classes must be held. In the light
of a long-standing Supreme Court decision, it does not seem evident that the state could
proscribe that Saturday and Sunday have to be compulsory days off.^'
4. Financing
Since Pierce, parents have had a right of choice. They have an option to send
their children to either a private or a public school. It does not mean that, the state has to
guarantee this choice by supporting the private schools financially. States willing to
finance private schools are limited by the federal Constitution. Judicial decisions have
interpreted the First Amendment under the doctrine of the "establishment clause'", which
prohibits the state from advancing or prohibiting religion. An "[e]xcessive entanglement
of government with religion may be viewed both as government's sponsorship of religion
and as its interference with the free exercise of religion". ^"^ Some forms of funding are
possible. In Board ofEducation ofCentral School District No. 1 v. Allen^\ the Supreme
Court found that "... cases have shown that the line between state neutrality to religion
and state support of religion is not easy to locate". ^"^ The judge writing for the majority
applied the "public purpose theory", which is an abandonment of the presumption that a
-'' 268 U.S. 510. 534 (1925); Runyon v. McCrar>', 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976); State of Ohio v. Whisner, 47
OhioSt.2d 181 (1976).
'° See Ohio Association of Independent Schools v. Goff. 92 F.3d 419(1 996).
^' See Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
'- Agostini v. Felton. 1 1 7 S. Ct. 1 997, 20 1 4 ( 1 997).
"392 U.S. 236(1968).
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state aides a religion to a certain extent when it finances a private school. A state may
provide a financial aid. as long as the aid serves secular purpose. In Allen, the Judgement
teaches that "a wide segment of informed opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found
that those schools do an acceptable job of providing secular education to their
students". "^^ Such language opens the door for discussions of how far the state can go in
aiding secular acts of private schools.
States have been creative in providing aid to private schools. Some have
established tax credits or tax deductions for parents of students at private schools. The
issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Committeefor Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Nyguist^^, where the state provided reimbursement of tuition for
nonpublic school parents and tax relief for those parents who had to pay the tuition."
The Court held that the statute had the effect of advancing religion and therefore violated
the Establishment Clause.'' In a subsequent case. Lemon v. Kurtzman . the Supreme
Court developed a three-pronged test to determine whether aid to private schools was
constitutional. The test "requires (1 ) that a statute have a secular purpose. (2) that is
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion and (3)
the statute must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion". But it is often a
thin line whether the state went beyond its competencies in financing private schools.
The test is not absolute, as demonstrated in Mueller v. Allen.^^ In this case, a tax
exemption was made possible for all parents, regardless of the school they had chosen for
^^
Id. at 247.
" Id. at. 247.
^^413 U.S. 756(1973).
''Id.
Id.
Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
/J. at 614.
463 U.S. 388(1983).
''I
39
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their children. The Supreme Court held that this was valid because private schools form
a viable alternative to public schools. They enhance competition, which justifies state
support to private schools. The Supreme Court allows financing of private schools
beyond material items such as textbooks or transport. As long as the state statute serves a
secular purpose, and the aid is offered to all, the states seems to be allowed to finance
private education. "*" This decision seems far-reaching, and in later decisions it looked as
if the Supreme Court went back to a stricter standard of separation of church and state
under the Establishment Clause. Yet Agostini v. Felton seems to overrule the stricter
standard and apparently goes back to the reasoning of Allen. The fact is that while
private schools enhance competition and provide a public service, they remain entirely
private corporations.
5. Employment Contract
In general, there are no special state or federal statutes that determine the terms
and conditions of employment contracts for teachers in private schools. Yet the state
does require minimum qualification standards, such as a degree requirement, that
constitutes a prerequisite for employment. The vast array of rules that governs the
relationship between the teacher and the employer in the public school does not exist in
the private context. In private schools, the basic employment contract is at-will.
Private schools are subject to the general statutes that are applicable to other
employers, such as statutory prohibitions against discrimination. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 " prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color.
' G. Sidney Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Religious Entities: The Total Subsidy Position Prevails, 58
FORDHAM L. Rev. 53(1 989).
*' See School District of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Asuilar v. Felton. 473 U.S.
402(1985).
''521 U.S. 203(1997).
"•-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, amended in 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
12
sex. national origin and religion, it applies to the terms, conditions and privileges of the
employment situation, which includes hiring and firing decisions, promotions and salary.
It also extends to seniority, all fringe benefits, job descriptions and assignments. But the
statute provides an exception to the prohibition of discrimination. It is possible for the
employer to make decisions based on sex. religion or national origin when this is "a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the operation of that particular
business or enterprise". There is no exemption for race. Thus a religious school may
invoke the bona fide occupational qualification of Title VII and the First Amendment.
Teachers only enjoy the general protection of employees in the private sector.
Thus, there is no general protection other than a contract claim for a denial of tenure
because specific grounds for tenure or dismissal do not exist in the private sector. A
private teacher does not have the protection of his public school counterpart. Since
private school teachers do not have any relationship with the government under the terms
of their employment, they cannot prevail on the constitutional guarantees, because the
Constitution does not restrict the actions of private employers.
6. Employment At-Will
The default for a contract for the teacher in a private school is the at will
employment contract. ^ When the contract provides no specific term for the termination,
as to time or cause for the dismissal, the contract can be terminated at all times and for no
reason, except for reasons violating Title VII and PDA. The employer need not have a
reason for the dismissal. But the doctrine has been eroded somewhat by a few courts that
have allowed at the at will rule to be circumvented through reliance on the language in
^^ Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291 (1936).
"•^ Massey v. Houston Baptist University', 902 S.W.2d 81 (1995).
13
written contracts, implied-in-fact contracts, the employment handbooks, customs or ihc
4X
facts that implied certain conditions in the employment contract.
A contract that specifies dismissal upon just cause, is probably exceptional.
Moreover, it is not always easy to determine what circumstances establish a termination.
In Johnson v. Savannah College ofArl^'\ an employee was transferred from a teaching
job to a non-teaching staff position. The Court found that the new position was related to
his experience. Thus, it held that the language of the contract was broad enough not to
recognize this transfer as a breach of contract."
7. Employment Manuals
For the private school teacher in particular, the contract clauses regulating
termination is ver>- important. It can provide that prior to discharge, the teacher must be
informed of the charges and be given a right to be heard. This constitutes binding
language on the employer."' It is also possible that instead of regulating termination
provisions in each contract individually, the school addresses this in an employment
manual. However, such manuals by their nature are not binding. Instead, courts often
require reliance."" A handbook can regulate the conditions of tenure, demotion or
dismissal, and the procedural issues that are applicable. But handbooks can also contain
disclaimers. Because of these contingencies, it is not possible to state that handbooks
vest rights for the employee."'' In order to be controlling, the language must be clear on
^^ 2 Mark A. Rothstein, Employment Law 231 (West 1994), 2 William D. Valente, Education
Law. Public and Private, 378 (West. 1985). See Wiethoff v. St. Veronica School, 48 Mich. App.163
( 1 973); Walters v. Amityville Union Free School Dist.. 25 1 A.D.2d 590 ( 1 998) (reliance on estoppel).
'' 218 Ga.App. 66(1995).
'"Id
^' Savannah College of Art & Design v. Nulph, 216 Ga. App. 48 (1994).
" See Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458 (1982), see also (specific for the school conte.xt)
Taggart v. Drake Univ.. 549 N.W.2d 796 (1996).
" Reid V. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6"^ Cir. 1986).
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its face.^^ The employment handbook, for private school teachers may duplicate rules
applicable to teachers in state schools. If there is consideration, these rules become
legally binding for private school teachers as well. Sometimes the handbook may
integrate only a part of these rules. In order to determine which provisions apply, the
teacher must examine the language in the handbook.
8. Other Erosions of Employment At-Will
Occasionally, courts may focus on an implied-in-fact contract to circumvent the at
will presumption. Although accepted by the courts as a means of overcoming the at will
doctrine, an implied-in-fact contract is not easy to prove. The intention of the parties
must be established. Courts often look to additional consideration, clear oral statements,
that are not vague, handbooks, past treatment of the employee, etc. in order to have an
implied-in-fact contract. "^^ When a jury could find that the teacher has legitimate
expectations grounded in the employer's statements, the teacher will have an implied-in-
fact contract, although without duration, that would not be merely at will.
9. Collective Bargaining
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)^ also regulates the teacher's
employment relationship. One of the earliest federal laws, it provides employees a right
to form or to join labor unions that can bargain with the employer. Absent a general
statute that regulates the employment relationship, the NLRA could be an important
statute when it comes to collective bargaining over terms and conditions of employment.
^^ Jacobs V. Mundelein College. 256 111. App.3d 476 (1993).
55
Hetes V. Schefman & Miller Law Office, 1 52 Mich.App. 117(1 986), Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Michigan. 408 Mich. 579 (1980). Beck v. Phillips Colleges. Inc.. 883 P.2d 1283 (1994).
^'29U.S.C.A. §"167.
15
Wherever collective bargaining for the teachers in the public schools is allowed, ii
determines the terms and conditions of the contract/ There is much information about
collective bargaining in the public school. Although the NLRA initially applied only to
private employees, there is not much information on collective bargaining in the private
schools. "^^ Whether this might be because no problems occur within the private context is
doubtful.
The NLRA determines when an employer is compelled to bargain with a union
and under what conditions the process of collective bargaining will occur. The statute
protects private employees when they act in concert. At first blush, the NLRA does not
provide an exception for private school teachers. In National Labor Relations Board v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago' the Supreme Court observed that the term "employee" does
not include a teacher from a religious school. ^*^' The Court reasoned that the NLRB is an
agency of the state, and controlling or interfering with the employment practices of a
private school would be an interference that goes beyond the boundaries of the First
Amendment. Moreover. Congress did not intend to include the private religious school
within the definition of the term "employer".^' This decision is the basis for excluding
teachers from of the scope of the Act. " The Board is a part of the collecfive bargaining
process, since the NLRB "will be called upon to decide what ... the terms and conditions
The NLRA does not apply to employment contracts in public schools. Since teachers are public
emplo>ees, the right to bargain collectively is not provided by the NLRA, but has to come from a state
statute. Because school districts are governmental agencies, only allowed to act within the boundaries of
the power granted to them, they need to be vested with the power of engaging into collective bargaining.
See section D public schools, collective bargaining.
See also Michael E. Hartmann, Spitting Distance: Tents Full ofReligious Schools in Choice Programs,
the Camel 's Nose ofState Labor Law Application to Their Relations With Lay Faculty Members, and the
First Amendment's Tether, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 553 (1997).
^^440 U.S. 490(1979).
''Id
'\ld
' Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the National Labor Relations Act 1 7 BERKELEY J.
Employment & Lab. L. 185,219(1996).
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of employment [are]..."." It is the Board that decides what the mandatory bargaining
issues are. Therefore, it would constitute an interference of the state when the NLRB
decides these issues with respect to religious schools.
But this is not a simple issue. Once again, it will depend on the state as to
whether a statute or case law allows the lay teacher to unionize and to bargain. ^"^ The
task of distinguishing between teachers from a private school with a religious nexus and
teachers from a private school without such a nexus cannot always be performed with
ease.^^ While it is true that schools without any religious nexus would have more
difficulties to show a constitutional claim under the First Amendment, the contrary is not
automatically true. The exclusion of these teachers leads to a substantial group of
employees who are exempt from the right to collective bargaining.
State constitutions or statutes that guarantee a right to collective bargaining are
not preempted by the NLRA. Church operated schools have tried to challenge these
constitutions or statutes under the First Amendment. ^^ Subsequently some courts have
held that the state's interests in guaranteeing a right to unionize does not outweigh the
private school's interest. ^^ But the state's right is not absolute, even if the state allows
unionization and collective bargaining, because the state is bound by the federal
Constitution. The union has a right to bargain collectively over everything, except the
issues exempted by the First Amendment. The scope of bargaining is in fact limited to
'''440U.S. 490, 502(1979).
Since Catholic Bishop demonstrates that the right to bargain collectively for private school teachers is
not provided by the NLRA, state law thus can provide such a right, but within the limits of the First
Amendment. As a matter of fact, some states do, like New Jersey. See South Jersey Catholic School
Teachers Organization v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary School, 150 N.J. 575 (1997).
^' R.ALPH D. M.AWDSLEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 1 16 - 123 (3'*^ ed.
NOLPE)(1995).
^M50 N.J. 575(1997).
^' Catholic High School Association v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1 161 (2d Cir. 1985).
'' 150 N.J. 575,592(1997).
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"wages, benefit plans and any other secular terms or conditions of employment". Only
a few states guarantee the right for lay teachers to unionize. Is it then the ca.se that
teachers from private non-religious schools enjoy the protection oJ the NLRA?
The relevance of this distinction seems questionable. The protection of the First
Amendment not only embraces the right to a religion, but also the right to have no
religion. Inasmuch as a non-religious school, proclaiming a philosophy of no religion,
has a protectable First Amendment right, such schools, too, are not bound by the NLRA.
This narrows the group of teachers of private schools that are able to enter into collective
bargaining. It seems hard to accept why there should exist a difference from other
private employees.
The absence of a right does not mean that there is no collective bargaining at all in
the private school. It simply means that the NLRB cannot force the school authority to
enter into collective bargaining. Collective bargaining simply does take place. Its
subjects vary from wages, benefits, working hours, number of students in the class, etc.
It most likely will not involve educational or ecclestical policies or supervision of the
teacher.
There are various reasons why the religious schools do not believe that certain
labor and employment laws apply to them. Another more prosaic reason is that such
laws are not ver>' popular with any employer, including the religious school employer.^'
Invoking religious autonomy of the church-related school is an easy way to avoid
the obligations imposed by the statutes. But it does not seem justified that the private
''Id.
Michael E. Hartmann, Spitting Distance: Tents Full ofReligious Schools in Choice Programs, the
Camel 's Nose ofState Labor Law Application to Their Relations With Lay Faculty Members, and the First
Amendment's Tether, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 553, 574 (1997).
Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory ofthe Religion Clauses: the case ofthe Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM.L. REV. 1373, 1400 (1981).
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schools can invoke the First Amendment. Teachers must illustrate indeed the tenets of a
religion, in religious as well as in secular classes, although not to the same extent that a
minister does. Moreover, the activities of the private school employer are comparable to
the activities of any other private employer. The Supreme Court's decision NLRR v.
Catholic Bishop ofChicago ' does not exclude private schools from the labor or
employment laws. In the five to four decision, the Court examined the legislative history
of the act and concluded that the Congress did not intend to include the private religious
schools as employers under the NLRA.
The Court reasoned that the NLRA enumerates the exceptions of the employer in
clear language. According to the parties in the said case, the definition of the term
emplover was not clear. When a statute is not clear, either Congress must enact an
interpretatorv' statute or more likely, the courts will are called upon to unravel the
meaning of the statute. In the latter case, a judge may use several techniques to interpret
the statute. First, he should try to determine what Congress intended. If that is not clear,
the judge may further look to the aim of the act and try to interpret it according to this
aim. The court may go in the direction of adapting the statute to changed societal needs.
In Catholic Bishop ofChicago ^. the Court opted for the historical perspective in
concluding that a private school was not an employer in the sense of the act. The
Supreme Court had an important motivation to do this, because it wanted to avoid the
question that would inevitably raise of whether the NLRA would violate the First
Amendment. The Court decided to avoid this problem by interpreting the act to exclude
private school from its scope, but the Court added one more exception. According to the
'- 440 U.S.490 (1979).
^-'
Id. at 504.
''440 U.S. 490(1979).
dissent, this was an unusual way to proceed. "^ As the dissent states, the outcome of the
case could have been different, in fact. Congress enacted a special statute to include non-
profit hospitals within the scope of the act. This was never questioned. But according to
the dissent, if the Court had taken the other direction, the question would have arisen
whether too excessive an entanglement would exist between Church and State. But this
was not a big hurdle, since the Free Exercise clause is not absolute. A governmental
action that burdens on the Free Exercise of religion may be justified by a compelling
State interest, as long as this action falls within the state's power.^^ The NLRA would
stand the challenge. Examining this issue, something very important seemed to be
overlooked: the right of the teachers.
10. Duties on the Job
The essence of the job of a teacher is to pass knowledge. However, the nature of
education reaches beyond the development of cognitive skills and techniques. It implies
also that a teacher attempts to instruct the future generation with the traditions of the
present generation. The teacher's role is pivotal. Thus, in addition, the school can
require the teacher to adhere to the philosophy of the school. This can be raised in the
employment contract or in the employment handbook. Breaching this requirement could
constitute employee misconduct. The misconduct can consist of several forms, such as
failing to provide proper teaching assignments, criminal behavior, or simply an
infringement of the rules the private schools.
11. Duties off the Job
Private schools exist because of philosophical and religious reasons. The school
generally expects its teachers to represent the school. It is apparent that the teacher
" See Justice Brennan, dissenting in 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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during work time has to obey the rules set out in the contract. Issues arise when the
teacher is off duty, especially when parts of the teacher's private life become publicly
visible and have repercussions on the school. In some cases, state or federal laws, such
as Title VII may apply. The scope of Title VII is broad, but it is not all encompassing.
Consider, for instance, the case of Boyd v. Harding Academy ofMemphis Inc. In this
case, a private school had a policy of firing teachers that engaged in sex outside marriage.
In Boyd, the plaintiff was first told that she was fired because of her pregnancy. She sued
under Title VII and lost in the lower court. On appeal, the teacher's claim was rejected
since she had not met the burden of proving the elements of a prima facie sex
discrimination case under Title VII. First, she had to prove that she was qualified for
the job. secondly, that she was pregnant, and third that she was terminated because of the
pregnancy. In this case, the employer could establish a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason, by showing that it had consistently disallowed extra-marital sexual relationships.
by terminating employees that found themselves in such a situation. The plaintiff could
not rebut this reason in showing that it was pretext. Therefore, the court noted that this is
no discrimination case, and found for the school.
Another interesting issue involves the religious beliefs a teacher must hold. This
issue can encompass both private off-duty conduct and work time conduct. Although
Title VII generally prohibits religious discrimination, secfion 702 of Title VII permits
'^ Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
''88F. 3d410(6"^Cir. 1996).
A discrimination claim under Title VII must contain four elements: the plaintiff belongs to a protected
class, the plaintiff was qualified and applied for the job, the plaintiff was rejected, the vacant job remained
open. The plaintiff has the burden of persuasion. Once a plaintiff has met the burden of a prima facie
discrimination claim, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason. The burden of persuasion never shifts. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 1 U.S. 792
( 1 973); Texas Dept. Of Community Affairs v. Burdine; 450 U.S. 248 (1981), Hazen Paper v. Bigains, 507
U.S. 604(1993).
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religious preferences.^'^ However, the employer must be a religious corporation or
educational institution and must have a non-profit character. In addition the institution
must be substantially owned by a church or a religious organization. Often disputes arise
as to how broad this exception can be. It is not clear whether the exemption allows only
hiring or discharge on the absolute basis of religious belief, or whether it includes also all
rules of conduct of a particular religious belief. Such a question arose in Little v.
Wueti^^ The school policy prescribed teachers not to engage in - among other things - a
rejection of the laws of the Roman Catholic Church. While on a leave, the teacher in
question remarried after a previous divorce that had not been approved by the Church,
since the divorce had not followed the canonical law. The teacher brought suit against
the school, claiming that the school violated Title VII. by discriminating against her on
the basis of religion. After the dismissal the teacher claimed that the school violated Title
VII. The Court of Appeal found for the school, interpreting Title VII as broad enough to
encompass conduct consistent with the employer's religious practices.
Litle V. Wuerl may be contrasted with EEOC v. Kamahameha Schools / Bishop
Estate^' in which the 9'*^ Circuit decided that religion does not constitute a bona fide
occupational qualification merely because of the nature of a private school. Title VII
imposes that discrimination on the basis of religion constitutes a bona fide occupational
qualification. In the case EEOC v. Kamahameha Schools / Bishop Estate, it was decided
that religion could not be a veritable bona fide occupational qualification. Although the
school was private, and required that its teachers be of protestant confession, it admitted
^^ Corp. Of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos. 483 U.S. 327
(1987).
*" 929 F.2d 944 (3''^ Cir. 1991).
^' 990 F.2d 458 (9"^ Cir. 1993).
->->
children of all persuasions. The judge held that the school, in educating in a pluralistic
way. was not a religious educational institution for purposes of Title VII. ~
12. Pregnancy
Discrimination against pregnant teachers has also been an issue. Title VII. the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 form the basis of protection for the female teacher. Under Title VII it is unlawful to
refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate on the basis of gender. Of
course, a problem for plaintiffs lies in proving that the reason for termination of
employment is due to pregnancy. The PDA refined Title VII by stating that women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work
Another source of contention is employee benefits. Here the issues have focused
on whether maternity leaves should be financed or not. and the length of the leave,
especially when compared to other sick leaves. California Federal Savings & Loan
Associates v. Guerra' confirmed that the right to job reinstatement from maternity leave,
when regulated by a state statute is certainly not preempted by the PDA. The case did
not definitively establish whether a mother is entitled reinstatement. However, the statute
dictates that female teachers have to be treated as any other employee, able or unable to
perform their job. Thus, a policy providing guaranteed reinstatement to other workers
o c
must be accorded to female teachers as well. " Where there is no policy, maternity leave
must be regarded as any other sick leave, and any decision by the employer to refiise a
^' McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 1 U.S. 792 (1973). Texas Dept. Of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
*•* 479 U.S. 272(1987).
request for a leave must not be based on a prohibited motive. It is interesting to note that
Title VII also applies to male teachers, wish to take a leave in order to raise their
children. Nothing in the statutes seems to preclude the right to leave for male teachers,
since gender does not include pregnancy alone.
To some extent, there is protection for female teachers. Title VII however only
applies to the discrimination based on sex. When a private school has a policy of
discharging unwed pregnant teachers, there is not much protection for the teacher under
Title VII. Some state courts merely accept the validity of the policy and the subsequent
discharge. ^^ Other courts, when the plaintiff is successful in her showing that the
pregnancy was the real reason, find that Title VII has been violated. One day it may be
possible to challenge such a discharge as conflicting with public policy. But it takes a
change in society to accept that pregnancy and childbirth are inalienable rights regardless
of the circumstances and that does not affect the employment in the private school.
D. Tort liability
1. Employee Liability
The teacher's duties lie not only within the context of the contract, but also
outside the scope of the contract. His duties refer to his liability for torts. "A tort is a
civil wrong", outside the scope of a contract. The remedy will be in the form of
damages. The tort is generated by the harm a person inflicted to another person. In order
to obtain damages, the plaintiff must prove the existence of the tortious act, the harm or
injury and the causal nexus between the act and the harm. Torts involve two major
*^ A lot of pregnancy related policies have been challenged. In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974), the teacher successfully challenged the policy, asserting that it violated her 14'*'
Amendment due process right.
^^ See also Schafer v. Board of Education of the School District of Pittsburgh, 903 F.2d 243 (3"* Cir. 1990).
*^ 88 F.3d 410 (1996); Ganzy v. Alen Christian School, 995 F. Supp. 340 (li998); Gosche v. Calvert High
School, 997 F. Supp. 867 (1998).
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categories: they can be malicious and intentional, they can result of the negligence.
Negligence refers to a conduct that falls below an acceptable standard, which results in
an injury.**'^ There is no fix standard and often the judge will be asked to decide on the
basis of the facts. Negligence can refer to carelessness or the failure to foresee potential
harm. The line between negligence and intentional misconduct is not always ver>' clear.
In examining whether an act constitutes negligence, courts have developed a set of
criteria, the first to be an obligation of a standard of care to another. The second point to
be examined is whether someone failed to exercise this standard of care. The third point
is obvious: did any accident happen in which a person suffered some kind of injury. The
forth matter to examine is whether the cause of injury was the failure of the ample care.
this failure being the direct cause. The standard of care a teacher owes has been
described as that of a reasonable and prudent person. Thus a court will compare the
degree of care the teacher in question owed with the degree of care that a reasonable and
prudent teacher would have exercised placed in the same circumstances. ' But the
standard varies depending on the circumstances. For instance, a gym class or a
laboratory class requires a higher standard of care than a class of English literature, since
the students are moving around, and engaging in actions that are more likely to cause
accidents, than when they sit and read. Age of the children is also a factor to take into
account. The duty will vary with children that are less mature. Usually the issue is
whether there was an adequate supervision. The school and the teachers must take all
necessary precautions to prevent any hazardous condition.^"^ Courts look to " ... whether
*^ Vigars v. Valley Christian Center of Dublin, 805 F. Supp. 802 (1992).
^'^ W. Page Keeton. Dann B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton. David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on
Torts, 165-173 Hornbook Series (West 5* Ed.).
^° Michael W. LaMorte, School Law Cases and Concepts 40 1 (Allyn and Bacon ed. 6* ed.) ( 1 998).
'- Laneheart v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 524 So.2d 138 (1988).
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the actual harm fell within a general field of danger which should have been
anticipated".^^
Whenever a teacher is accused of negligence, the teacher's first defense usually is
to demonstrate that the constitutive elements for negligence were not established. In
most cases, however, it will not be easy to use this as a defense. Then, the teacher
probably will attempt to demonstrate that the injured individual is to blame integrally or
partially for the injury and is thus contributorily negligent. But it is often difficult for the
teacher to prove that the victim is fully to blame for the injury, because children are not
always able to estimate the consequence of their deeds. However, a child is not immune
from negligence, and the child's age. physical characteristics, gender, education, will be
taken into account in assessing blame. In Cormier v. Sinega! ", the judge found the
child contributory negligent in committing an act in gross disregard of safety in the face
of known, perceived, and understood dangers.
If a teacher is successful in showing that the child was contributory negligent, the
teacher can avoid having to pay damages, although his conduct may still constitute a civil
wrong. While this may seem unduly harsh, since children are usually not able to
properly assess whether a situation is hazardous, the teacher may not be completely
absolved, since the court may hold the parties jointly responsible.*^^ This defense
constitutes comparative negligence and damages will be awarded according to the degree
of responsibility of each party. Sometimes, the teacher is not at all to blame. This is
when the teacher foresees a hazardous situation and tells a child to adapt its conduct, but
the child does not.
'' McLeod V. Grant County School Dist. No. 128,42 Wash.2d 316, 321 (1953).
^^ Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School Law 471 (West 3"^ Ed.).
^' 180So. 2d. 567(1965).
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A second category of torts consists of intentional interference. Contrary to its
name, the wrongdoer does not need to plan to inflict an injury. However, invading the
rights of another constitutes an intentional tort. The intent can be deduced from the act.
For instance, assault and battery form one category of intentional torts, defamation forms
another. In the education context, claims based on these grounds are uncommon, but
may occur in the course of disciplining a student.^*^ Although courts apparently are rather
willing to accept that teachers can discipline students under the doctrine of "in loco
parentis" '^'^ they have held that teachers must act within the boundaries of
reasonableness.'
'
2. Employer Liability
A private school can be held liable for the misconduct of its employee. This is
certainly the case when teachers engage in intentional acts.'°^ The question is whether
the school knew or could have known of the employee's propensity to a certain
conduct. '^'^ In order for the school to be held liable, the employee must have acted within
the scope of the employment, which means that the employee must have committed an
act that is in the "prosecution of the employer's business and within the scope of the
^^
Id. at 569.
^^ Akins V. Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 N.Y. 325 (1981).
'^ Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School Law 459 (West 3"* Ed.)
^^ See Id. at 460, and MICHAEL W. LaMorte, School Law Cases and Concepts 10 (Allyn and Bacon
ed. 6*ed.)(1998).
'^'* In loco parentis stands for the fact that the "teacher stands in place of the parent and in such capacity
has a right to chastise a pupil". Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School
Law 460 (West 3''' Ed.).
"" 5ee Simms V. School Dist. No. 1 13 0r.App. 1 19 (1973) and KERN ALEXANDER AND M. David
Alexander, American Public School Law 460 (West 3"' Ed.). But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977). In this case, the Supreme Court upheld corporal punishment in a public school, after students
claimed it to be a violation of their constitutional rights.
'°' See Gebsen v. LagoVista School District, 1 1 8 S.Ct. 1 989 ( 1 998).
'"^ Thatcher v. Brenn^an, 657 F. Supp. 6 (1986), Copeland v. Samford Univ., 686 So.2d 190 (1996).
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employee's authority".'""^ An act that is substantially different from the acts that are
authorized, are not considered in the scope of the employment.
E. Public schools
Teachers working for a public school are public employees. In the United States,
it is well established a separation between the state and the church exists. This separation
between church and state in the United States, results in the fact that public schools have
to provide a neutral education. The United States Supreme Court has held that there is a
"wall of separation" between church and state. "^^ As a consequence, teachers must avoid
engaging in a conduct that fosters a religious view. To check whether the separation of
church and state has been violated, the Supreme Court developed the Lemon test.' '' The
/no
latest decision, Lee v. Weisman '' , where the constitutionally of a prayer at graduation
after a student vote was challenged, also gave birth to heated discussion whether this test
has been overruled or not. because it was a 5 to 4 decision. '*^*'^ It also led to a split in the
circuits"^ which reveals that the neutrality, especially the extent of it. in the public
school is a highly debated matter.
No matter what test is used to determine whether an exercise is constitutional'",
there is the basic principle of separation of church and state, forbidding any endorsement
of religion by the state. It means that a display of the Ten Commandments is not
'°^ Loper V. Yazoo and M.V.R. Co., 145 So. 743 (1933).
'°^ Forester v. State, 1 69 Misc.2d 531(1 996).
'"" Everson V. Board of Education. 330 U.S. 1. (1947) citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 146, 164
(1878).
'°^ Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
'°^ 505 U.S. 577(1992).
This test has been the subject of vigorous attack. It is said that the test is too strict, because it leaves out
too much religion of the public school. See Michael A. Berg, The Religious Right, Constitutional Values,
and the Lemon Test, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 72 (1995) and Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing thejuice
out ofthe Lemon Test, 72 EduC. L. Rep. 1, 3 (1992).
"° Jones V. Clear Creek Independent School District, 977 F.2d 963 (5* Cir. 1992) and Ingebretsen v.
Jackson Public School District, 88 F.3d 274 (5"^ Cir. 1996).
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possible"", unless thy are demonstrative -- part of a general display, showing other
religions as well. Some states try to overcome this prohibition in providing the opening
of the school day with a brief reflection not intended to be a prayer.
The essence of public education is that the schools provide free education, not
limited to the elementary schools. The public schools are funded with public
resources."^ Judicial decisions have held that fees for matriculation or registration
constitute a condition of attendance, which violates this principle of free education.
Yet a school can charge fees for extracurricular activities, such as athletic events, theatre,
literary events or school transport."^ However, the extent to which fees are regarded as
incidental and therefore legitimate is a state matter"^, because each state constitution and
legislation must be analyzed. The distinction seems to lie between the fees charged for
essential activities and fees charged for extra-curricular activities, with an ongoing
discussion of where to classify a fee for textbooks. An outstanding analysis is provided
in Hartzell v. Connell.
'
'
^ Hartzell postulated that as long as the fee does not keep the
student from equal access to basic education, the fee might be legitimate. Hence, it is the
state's responsibility to provide a school system free of charge with access to all. Yet
school financing has undergone drastic cutbacks recently, with apparent detrimental
consequences to the quality of public education. If the financing of public schools is
threatened to such an extent that schools are forced to close, or if the quality of education
'" The Lemon test is not the only one developed. In Shervert v. Vemer, the Supreme Court held that the
state must have a compelling justification, when it places a burden on religion. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
"- Ring. V. Grand Forks School District No. 1, 483 F. Supp 272 (D. North Dacota 1980).
"" Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-1050 (1994). This statute has been upheld in Bown v. Gwinnett County School
District, 1 12 F.3d 1464 (ll"' Cir. 1997).
"* Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander. American Public School Law 36 (West 3"^ Ed.).
"^ Michael W. LaMorte, School Law Cases and Concepts 83 (Allyn and Bacon ed. 6'*' ed.) (1998)
'
'^ Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450 ( 1 988).
"^ Hartzell v. Connell. 35 Cal.3d 899 (1984).
'''Id.
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suffers, it is clear that this undermines the purpose of the free pubHc school. Thus
financing of public education and quality of the education related to its financing are
important state responsibilities.
The state constitutions provide the basis upon which each state legislature acts.
The legislature must establish the public education system, and can do so according to its
discretion. As long as it stays within the boundaries of the competence bestowed by the
state constitution, the legislature can model, remodel, enlarge or shrink and control the
system.
Although the state provides for the establishment of public education, the
legislature does not operate the school system. "" The classical explanation for this is
that a state has to function through administrative agencies, because in the United States
the view has been one of not confusing the branches of power. ~ In educational matters,
this means that the authority for the operation of the public schools is delegated to a
board of education, which may be either elected or appointed, and which has authority to
perform administrative functions.'" The officials can be elected; but in some states, the
legislature appoints the officials. The organization and its nomenclature may vary from
state to state, but all of these bodies act on the local level. '"^ Its officials are state
officials.'""* These school districts are clothed with powers they cannot give away. This
is very important in the case of class voting on prayers or other religious acts in the
"'' San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 931 S.W. 2d 535 (1996).
'° H. C. HuDGiNGS, JR. & Richard S. Vacca, Law and Education, Contemporary issues and
Court Decisions 59 (The Michie Company 3 rd Ed.).
Contrast this to the model in Belgium, where the legislative branch sometimes delegates power to the
executive branch.
'" Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School Law 73 (West 3"^ Ed.).
'-' H. C. Hudgings, jr. & Richard S. Vacca, Law and Education, Contemporary issues and
Court Decisions 58 (The Michie Company 3 rd Ed).
•-' Boar
(1951).
'"* d of Educ. Louisville v. Society of Alumni of Louisville Male High School, 239 S.W.2d 931
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schools. '^^ The boards are vested with discretionary power, which means that they can
act within the boundaries of their judgment.'"^ It means that their decision has the power
of law, without any further approval being needed. The board exercises such power
when it employs teachers, when it decides to buy logistic materials, such as a building for
the school or implementing new extra-curricular programs. Discretion means that the
power of the agency is based upon the statute. If the statute is silent on a certain issue,
courts have held that the agency could make final binding decisions, but the agency
cannot act ultra vires.
The board's executive actions can be classified as either discretionary or
ministerial. " A discretionary act requires judgment, while a ministerial act refers to a
duty performed by an administrator, for which no judgment is required. ''^'^ The
distinction is important in disputes concerning personnel, especially in dismissal cases. '^^
1 . Employment Contract
Public school teachers have a number of rights guaranteed either through statutory
provisions or through case law. For instance, tenured teachers enjoy more protection
particularly against dismissal than non-tenured teachers or private school teachers.'^'
Also, public school teachers, since they are public employees, can rely on rights provided
by the federal Constitution.
'-^ See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
'-^ Black's Law Dictionary 323 (6"^ ed. 1990).
'-^ Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School Law 74 (West 3"* Ed.).
''* H. C. HuDGiNGS, JR. & Richard S. Vacca, Law and Education, Contemporary issues and
Court Decisions 63 (The Michie Company 3 rd Ed.).
'-' H. C. HuDGiNGs, JR. & Richard S. Vacca, Law and Education, Contemporary issues and
Court Decisions 63 (The Michie Company 3 rd Ed.).
'^° See Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School Law 76 (West 3"^ Ed.).
Yet some private school teachers can rely on contractual guarantees that are similar to the status of
tenure.
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Yet before a public school teacher can become tenured, he must fulfill certain
conditions. The first prerequisite is that a teacher, in order to be allowed to work in a
public school must posses a valid certificate. A certificate means a license to teach. '
Since public education is a matter of the states, it will vary from state to state what the
requirements for qualification and certification will be. Such a statute can order a
detailed set of requirements, related to education, major field of study, scores and
experience, as well as a certain age and a good medical condition.
But teachers not only need to satisfy educational and pedagogical requirements;
they will also have to prove that they are persons of good moral character. When they
succeed in presenting all the requirements, they will obtain a certificate. This allows
them to teach, but it is not a guarantee of a job or ofjob security.'""' In the United States,
local school boards have discretion in personnel affairs. Therefore, as long as it falls
within statutory limits, schools can require additional qualifications.' '^ States often place
time limits on the validity of the license. After a period of time, the teacher must renew
the license, which is often coupled with additional courses or a year of study. It is
imperative that a teacher be certificated, otherwise, he cannot be a professional teacher.
The certifications are not issued by the school, but usually by the state. '"'"^ As a result, the
revocation of the license is separate from the non-renewal and the dismissal of the
teacher, which is determined by the school.
The local boards of education make the selection of the teacher, after
recommendation of the principal. The teacher enters in an employment contract with the
'^- Green v. Bay Educ. Assoc, v. State Dept. of Pub. Instruction, 154 Wis.2d 655 (1990).
'" Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School Law 559 (West 3"* Ed.).
'^^ Harrah Independent School District v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979).
'" H. C. HuDGiNGS, JR. & Richard S. Vacca, Law and Education, Contemporary issues and
Court Decisions 169 (The Michie Company 3 rd Ed.).
school, and the local boards have the authority to enter into contract with the teacher. '^^
In hiring, the school boards, like any private employer, must comply with state and
federal statutes such as Title VII.
State law provides job security protection to teachers, by according them the
status of tenure. Teachers who have not acquired tenure statutes, have far less job
security. Before obtaining tenure, teachers will be employed on a year-to-year basis, and
after a period of years of employment, which varies from state to state, they will be
eligible for tenure. Although tenure confers job security, it also derogates the rule of the
at will employment, because the teacher's protection for the continuing employment is
not absolute.'^'' Instead, tenure guarantees that the school board cannot dismiss a teacher
without cause. These causes are usually related to substantial unfitness '^, immorality,
and incompetence. '^° There must be a just cause available to terminate the contract,
which "requires that [the] decision to terminate ... must be reasonable"'.'"*'
Tenure is determined under state law. Some states do not recognize tenure as
such. However, if a teacher obtains continuing employment, he must be accorded some
elementary rights, such as notice, or a hearing before he can be disciplined or terminated.
If there is no tenure, it will be a question of fact whether the teacher had a reasonable
expectation for continued employment.'"*" A tenured teacher cannot invoke his tenure
status in a different school system within the same state, nor can he automatically claim
his status when he moves to another state.
'^^ Marsh v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ. 349 So.2d 34 (1977).
137
Harrah Independent School Distr. V. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979).
"^ Simmons v. Drew, 716 F.2d 1 160 (1983).
'" Baldridge v. Board of Trustees, Rosebud County Schools, 287 Mont. 53 (1998); Hall v. Board of
Trustees of Sumter County School Dist. No. 2, 330 S.C. 402 (1998).
""^ Pa Stat. Ann Tit. 24, § 1 1-1 102 (1962).
"'" Doschadis v. Anamosa Community School Dist., 13 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
''-
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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2. Duties on the Job
An other important issue concerning the public school teachers is the right of
freedom of expression. Until Pickering v. Board ofEducation ofTownship High School
District 205^'^^, teachers were allowed only a limited freedom of expression. In the wake
of this judgment, courts have developed a two-prong test to determine the teacher's
rights.
'"^^ The first prong consists of determining whether the speech concerns an issue of
concern to the public. The second prong consists of determining the balance between
harmony in the workplace and the need for a close working relationship between the
teacher and his coworkers. In this second prong, the judge must determine whether this
speech undermines the relationship. In making this determination, there must be a
balancing of the time, the place and the manner of the speech. The judge must also
determine the context in which this speech was made and he must measure the degree of
public interest. Finally the judge must determine whether this speech hinders the teacher
from performing his actual job duties. '^"^ Non-tenured teachers enjoy the First
Amendment Rights along with tenured teachers.
Freedom of expression, whether inside or outside the classroom is closely related
to the constitutional right of privacy which is not explicit in the Constitution, but is
implicitly derived from the 14'*^ Amendment. '"^^ Teachers serve as role models. Their
private lives are affected by this role. The cases establish the fact that a teacher basically
surrenders his private life for this role. For instance, it has been held that schools can
''*^ 205. 391 U.S. 563(1968).
''"' Roberts v. Van Buren Public Schools, 773 F.2d 949(8* Cir. 1985); Cox v. Dardanelle Public School
District, 790 F.2d 668 (8* Cir. 1986).
'^^ Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
'^^ Martha McCarthey& Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe, Public School Law, Teacher's and
Students' Rights 301 (Allyn and Bacon 3"^ ed.) (1992).
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prescribe dress codes ''^^, or that teachers may not divorce. School boards have
justified these strict rules on the grounds that teachers serve as role models and therefore
should conform strictly to community norms. Thus there has been a tension between the
school and school boards on the one hand and the teacher on the other.
3. Duties of the Job
Judges have often been called upon to balance the school's disapproval of a
teacher's conduct and the right of the teacher to enjoy a life outside the school gate. It is
clear that the law has evolved from the rigid standards applied in the beginning of this
century to the current balancing of interests. For example, a teacher's conduct that is not
detrimental to his class performance, but yet is not approved by the school district, can no
longer be a cause for dismissal. One of the most illustrative cases is Morrison v. State
Board ofEducation. In this case, the teacher engaged in homosexual conduct outside
the school, which resulted in a revocation of his certificate by the local school board.
The California Supreme Court reversed the revocation. The decision presents a series of
questions that are relevant to any determination whether a dismissal is justified. The
relevant inquiries under Morrison are whether the conduct adversely affects either the
students or the teacher's colleagues, or both; what is the age of the students; to what
extent may disciplinary action limit the rights of the teacher. '^°
Today most courts reason that teachers have a right to engage in sexual conduct,
be it marital or not. " Since Morrison, courts are likely to decide that a teacher may be
'^^ Miller v. School District No. 1 67, 495 F.2d 658 (7'*' Cir. 1 974); Tardiff v. Quin, 545 F.2d 76 1 ( T' Cir.
1996).
'*^ Gosche V. Calvert High School, 997 F.Supp. 867 (1998).
"•^
1 Cal. 3d 214 (1969).
'V^. at 229 (1969).
'^' Erb V. Iowa State Board of Public Education, 216 N.W.2d 339 (1974).
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dismissed if his conduct appears to make him unfit as a teacher. ^' But the conduct must
represent a danger; in particular to students, before it can constitute a valid reason for
termination.'^^ The Morrison ruling has established the test that there must be a nexus
between the teacher's off-duty conduct and his job performance. "^ Clearly, teachers
enjoy a greater degree of privacy than they did decades ago. But whether this degree of
privacy extends to a homosexual relationship remains questionable. Often, the outcome
will depend upon the state's general tolerance of homosexual conduct. In Georgia for
instance, there is apparently less tolerance than in California. "" In a 1986 decision.
Bowers v. Hardwick ^
,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Georgia criminal law
penalizing private, consensual sodomy. The Court examined the case almost solely under
the angle from homosexuality. Prior to this decision, there was no general rule as to how
far the right to off-duty conduct in sexual orientation extended. Some courts considered
the fact that the school board, the students, or the parents had mere knowledge of
homosexual orientation of a teacher a sufficient cause for dismissal.''^ Although public
school teachers do not have to adhere to a philosophical or religiously inspired school
policy, nevertheless they are not entirely free to claim that their private lives cannot be
separated from their job performance, because since some facets of their private life may
have a bearing on their job performance. The notion of the teacher as a role model may
be not as vivid as it was formerly, but it has not been completely abandoned, either.
When a dismissal or disciplinary act is challenged, courts will often decide that under the
'" LaSota v. Town of Topsfield, 979 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1997); Collins v. Faith School District No. 46-
2, 574 N.W.2d 889 (S.D.1998).
'" Thompson v. Southwest School Distr., 483 F. Supp. 1 170 (1980); Sherburne v. School Board of
Suwannee County, 455 So.2d 1057 (1984).
Todd A. DeMitchell, Commentary, Private Lives: Community Control vs. Professional Autonomy 78
Ed. Law Rep. 187, 194(1993).
'^^ See Board of Education of Long Beach Unified School District v. Jack M, 19 Cal.3d 691 (1977).
'^^478 U.S. 186(1986).
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nexus between off-duty conduct and classroom teaching versus potential harm to the
students the teacher's conduct was of such a nature that it would affect job performance.
But whatever test courts may develop, the ultimate judgment of a teacher's conduct will
remain an elastic concept, since it will have to be judged from a perspective of the
community norm.
4. Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining is not a constitutional right for public school teachers, just
as it is not for their private school counterparts. Instead, the right is determined under the
discretion of each individual state. Not all states allow their public employees to enter
into collective bargaining agreements and others allow it only to a limited extent. But,
some type of collective bargaining right exists in almost every state. ''"'^ Thus, since
public schools are supported by public funds, in weaker economic times, the right to
unionize and bargain collectively will probably be more strictly construed. ''^'^ One
argument often raised against the right is that a teacher has a role too important to
unionize (which applies to ability to strike as well).
In states where there is no legislation allowing collective bargaining for teachers,
it is questionable whether the school board can enter into collective bargaining at all.
Courts have accepted the possibility, since school boards are vested with the power to
hire, to terminate, and to fix terms and conditions of employment. As a consequence,
school boards can do this not only on an individual scale with one teacher, but also on the
collective scale, which results in collective bargaining. But, it will often depend on a
school board, whether a school can enter into collective bargaining with the teachers. A
'" Gaylord v. Tacoma School District No. 1 0, 559 P.2d 1 340 ( 1 977).
'^* Hugh D. Jascourt, Collective Bargafning Issues in Public School Employment in Legal
Issues in Public School Employment (Phi Delta Kappa Indiana) ( 1 983).
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Florida case demonstrates the reluctance of courts to enforce the agreements. The
difference between the collective bargaining of a private employer and a public employer
lies in the fact that the public employer is binding the government. This raises issues of
interference by the executive branch with the legislative branch.
Unless there is a legislative guarantee of the right to unionize, any such right can
be easily denigrated. But the ideas developed under the so-called "Reagan-era" - - the
right for parents to chose between a public and a private high school, the resistance of
imposing taxes in order to fund a public school and the idea that a public service should
function as a private company, do not enhance the relations among the unions and the
school boards and the public. ^~ The system of vouchers, where public funding is used
even in the context of private schools, the system of merit-based compensation of
teachers, and the abolition of the tenure status seem not to match with existence of
collective bargaining at all. " Such an individually orientated system goes against the
philosophy of collective bargaining, where the teachers will be treated similar. Instead,
classic bargaining issues include wages, the length of a school day. the class size, the
financial benefits such as health insurance, dental plans and sick leave insurance. These
subjects also fall within the realm of state law. Thus what will be regarded, as a
bargainable item in one state does not necessarily mean that it will be a bargainable item
in another state.
'^'*
'''' See Donald D. Slesnick II & Jennifer K. Poltrock, Public Sector Bargaining in the Mid-90S (the 1980S
Were Challenging. But This Is Ridiculous) - A Union Perspective 25 J.L. & Educ. 661 (1996).
'^° State V. Florida Police Benevolent Association. 6 1 3 So.2d 415(1 992); Chiles v. United Faculty of
Florida, 615 So.2d67I (1993).
\b\ 613 So.2d415(I992).
See also Leslie R. Stellman, Coping with School Public Employee Labor Relations in the Tax-Conscious
'90S: an Employer's Perspective 25 J.L. & EDUC. 673 (1996).
'^' Donald D. Slesnick II & Jennifer K. Poltrock, Public Sector Bargaining in the Mid-90S (the 1980S Were
Challenging, But This Is Ridiculous) - A Union Perspective 25 J.L. & Educ. 661, 670 (1996).
'*'^ H. C. HuDGrNGs. JR. & RJCH.^RD S. Vacca. Law and Education. Contemporary issues .and
Court Decisions 1 18 - 122 (The Michie Company 3 rd Ed.) and Leslie R. Stellman, Coping with School
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A major problem for teachers lies with the cutback of funding by the state
government so that the school board can no longer assure the performance of the
negotiated agreements. '^"^ Teachers and their unions cannot sue the school board.
because the non-fulfillment of the agreement with the union by the school board is
usually not a breach of contract. Repeatedly, courts have decided that whenever a
compelling state interest is involved and the school board, due to governmental actions
beyond its control cannot fulfill its obligations, this breach of contract is justified. '^^ So,
collective bargaining agreements may not be subject to general contract law.
Some states take a blatant stand against collective bargaining. Such is the case in
North Carolina and Texas, where such bargaining is prohibited by statute. Georgia does
not favor collective bargaining, either, at least not as far as the right to strike is
concerned. This is true under statute and under case law.
While it is a constitutional right for every person to join a union . bargaining
and strike are not a necessary consequence of this right. There is no constitutional duty
for a school board to bargain collectively with one (exclusive) union. Some states have
statutes that regulate collective bargaining for the public schools, but it does not always
follow that teachers have the right to strike to enforce the process. In these states, school
boards and unions must bargain in good faith under applicable state statutes. Unions
have tried to secure their position through the establishment of an agency shop.'^^ This is
Public Employee Labor Relations in the Tax-Conscious '90S: an Employer s Perspective 25 J.L. & Educ.
673,677(1996).
"'" See Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayorand City Council of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012 (1993).
'*'' State V. Florida Police Benevolent Association, 613 So.2d415 (1992); Chiles v. United Faculty of
Florida, 615 So.2d 671 (1993).
"'^ Michael W. LaMorte, School Law Cases and Concepts 252 (Allyn and Bacon ed. 6'*' ed.) ( 1 998)
and International Longshoremen's Association AFL-CIO v. Georgia Ports Authority. 217 Ga. 712 (1962).
'^^ AFSCME V. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137(1 969).
See Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission, 42 Wis.2d 637 (1969).
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situation in which unions are able to charge a fee to all employees, without regard to
whether or not they are union members.' ''" This position has been upheld in Ahood v.
Detroit Board ofEducation.
^^^ The Abood court decided that the threshold question is
whether the union engages in political activities that are objectionable to the employee.
In states where no law regulates the process of collective bargaining, such
bargaining is in the mere discretion of the school board. Teachers in such states are in a
weaker position, since the reached agreements may not be binding, since tax and
governmental constraints can erode the process. Thus, a school board could be
compelled to breach the agreements. In fact, it is a delicate question whether teachers are
bound by the collective agreements at all. If disregard of such agreements by the school
board becomes pervasive, the whole purpose of collective bargaining would become
useless. It seems that when the school board and the union reach an agreement, both
have an obligation to execute the agreement in good faith. So long as conditions of the
agreement remain unchanged and there are no legislative constraints, the agreement must
be adhered to. This means that teachers must stick to their agreement as well. If the
school board no longer adheres to the agreement, what right do teachers have? Usually,
when legal enforcement is not possible, teachers may strike, although some states
prohibit this by statute. Usually, teachers are not in a position of strength. Instead, the
school board holds the cards because it determines the renewal of the teacher's contracts,
decides about eligibility for tenure and has the ultimate power of termination.
Just as the privacy rights for teachers have changed, so too has protection against
dismissal because of gender, including pregnancy, childbirth and maternity. This
™ See Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School Law 754 (West 3"^
Ed.).
'^'431 U.S. 209(1977).
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discriminatory practice has been invalidated under the 14"^ Amendment.' ' The statutorv'
basis for the protection for public school teachers is the same as for the teachers in the
private school, i.e.. Title VII and PDA. With respect to leave policies, the school has
greater latitude. In general, the leave policy will be upheld by the courts if the school can
establish a valid business reason for the policy.
'^^ As long as there is no discriminatory
motive in the school board's action, the policy will be upheld.
F. Tort Liability
As in the case of private school teachers, public school teachers may also be held
liable for certain torts, such as assault and battery, and negligence. The criteria for
liability do not differ from those applicable to private school teachers. However, the fact
that the public school teacher can be held liable is not self-evident. Since teachers are
public employees, one might think that they enjoy qualified immunity. Instead the
opposite is true. Immunity enjoyed by the public school itself has never been extended to
its teachers. When a teacher intentionally inflicts injury upon a student, the teacher may
be held liable for an intentional tort. When the teacher's actions fall below a standard of
reasonable care, when he fails to foresee a hazardous condition, and when he does not
take the necessary actions to avoid the danger, he may be liable for negligence.
1. Employer Liability
Traditionally, school districts have been considered agents of the state. The state
enjoys governmental immunity under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, that '"the King
can do no wrong". Courts cannot order the state to pay for damages, since that would
result in an invasion of the separation of powers. Only the state legislature can make this
'" Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 792 (1973).
'^' DeLaurier v. San Diego Unified School District, 588 F.2d 674 (9"' Cir. 1978).
'^^ MiCHAKL W. LaMorte, SCHOOL Law CASES AND CONCtPTS 385 (Allyn and Bacon ed. 6"' ed.)(1998).
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decision. This means, in general, that school districts themselves cannot be sued for tort
actions. But because the doctrine of unqualified sovereign immunity has been eroded.
some states now allow school districts to be held liable. In those states, it is possible for
the individual claimant to sue the school district.
'^'^ Other states adhere to the doctrine of
immunity, but allow the school district to be sued in a limited capacity such as liability
for school bus accidents. '^^ Still, other states consider the purchase of an insurance
I 77
policy to be a waiver of immunity within the boundaries of the policy. There are some
states, however, that do not consider such a purchase to be a waiver of immunity.
Immunity from suit does not mean that the state agency cannot commit a wrongful act, it
merely means that it cannot be held liable for it. But it does mean that the agency cannot
be held liable for the acts of its employees, even when they are acting within the scope of
their employment.
'"
In Dcn-is v. DeKalb County School, 996 F.Supp. 1478 (N.D.Ga. 1998) the court held that the school
district is immune, unless the immunity is waived. In Malik w Greater Johnstown Enlarged School Dist..
248 A,D.2d 774 (1998) the court held that although "[t]undamentally, a school is not an insurer of safety of
its students; it is nonetheless, obligated to adequately supervise the activities of the students under its care
and will be held liable for foreseeable injuries which ... are related to the absence of supervision". Id. at
775. See also Reed v. Pawling Cent. School Dist. 245 A.D.2d 281(1 997); Etheredge v. Richland School
Dist. I., 1 16 N.C.App. 715 (S.C.App 1997); Doe v. New Philadephia public Schools Bd. Of Educ. 996
F.Supp. 741 (1998); Williams V. Central Consol. School Dist. 124 N.M. 488 (1998); Ortega v. Pajaro
Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal. App. 4th 1023, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 777 (1998). The latter case is a good
example that a waiver of immunity may only be done within certain limits. The school district may be
liable for its own negligence, but "[t]he district may not, however, be held vicariously liable...". Id. at
1057, at798. But see Cook v. Hubbard Exempted Village Bd. of Educ. 1 16 Ohio App. 3d 564 (1996); ALA.
Const. Art. 1, § 14; Godby v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. 996 F.Supp. 1390 (1998); Nelson
v.Almont Community Schools, 93 1 F.Supp. 1 345 ( 1 996).
"^ Womack v. Duvemay 229 A.D.2d 488 (1996); Brown v. Egan Consol. School Dist. No. 50, 449 N.W.2d
259(1989).
'^^ Example of the fact that purchase of insurance affects immunity: Thomas v. Broadlands Community
Consol. School Distr. No. 201, 348 111. App. 567 (1953); Molitor v. Kaneland Community District No. 302,
18 111. 2d II (1959); Rogers V. Butler, 92 S.W.2d 414 (1936). In general, the immunity is supported by the
idea that governmental activities are undertaken for the benefit of the public (Bolster v. City of Lawrence,
225 Mass. 387 (1917)). These activities are funded through taxes, therefore it would be an unreasonable
burden on the public funds to use them for damages. See Wilson v. Stark City Dept. of Human Serv., 70
Ohio St. 3d 450 (1994). It does not mean that the district is not capable of committing a tort, but rather that
it is not able to pay for the damages. Inasmuch that a school purchases an insurance policy, it recognizes
its ability not only to commit the wrongful conduct, but also to pay for the damages within the scope of the
policy. See James for James v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 60 N.C. App. 642 ( 1 983). The
purchase of the policy affects only to a limited amount the "public purse". The damages are paid by the
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Even if school districts are not liable because of the immunity they enjoy a victim
could try to recover damages under the respondeat superior doctrine. Several claims
have been rejected by the courts in this matter, because the school cannot be held liable
for actions of the teacher that are outside the scope of his employment. The courts in at
least one state recognize the liability under this doctrine for law enforcement agencies
and health care providers, but remain reluctant to accept liability under respondeat
superior for schools. '^^ Although a valid argument can be that assaults by a teacher can
be foreseen and that the teacher is acting on behalf of the school in committing the
assault, courts seem unwilling to accept this theory. Since the school cannot pay a tort
recovery with public funds, the school district may not be held liable for the teacher's
actions under any theory. Thus victims are left out in the cold. But in selecting and
employing a teacher, a school, just as any other employer, should proceed with a duty of
care. Although the teacher is responsible for his or her own acts, the injustice against the
victim is evident and courts are still split on the basic question.
insurance company. Therefore, the purchase of an insurance means a waiver of immunity, but only to the
extent of the poUce.
'^^ Richard Fossey and Todd A. DeMitchell, ''Let the master answer": Holding Schools Vicarously Liable
When Employees Sexually Abuse Children 25 J. L. &. EDUC. 575, 579 - 580 (1996).
'^^ There is a substantial difference between the funds of the public and the private school. This difference,
and the purpose of it has been clearly described in Gebsen v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist, 1 18
S.Ct. 1989 (1998). In this case, a high school student had a sexual relationship with a teacher. The school
terminated the teacher. The school had not yet distributed an official grievance procedure for lodging
sexual harassment complaints, required by statute. The student filed suit for damages against the school.
The Federal District Court granted the school summary judgment, which was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit,
which held that school districts are not liable under Title IX, the basis for the student's claim, unless an
employee with supervisory power knew of the abuse, had the power to end it and failed to do so. The
Supreme Court was called upon to address the issue. It held that Congress did not intend liability in
damages when the school is unaware of a Title IX violation. One of the reasons is, that this statute does not
provide an express claim for damages. But, more important, another reason is that the award of damages in
such a case might exceed the level of funding. Examples of cases where schools have immunity under
respondeat superior: Shirkey v. Keokuk County, 281 N.W. 837 (1938); Reed v. Rhea County, 189 Tenn.
247 (1949). Cases that allow respondeat superior: Smith v. Board of Educ. Of Kanawha County, 170
W.Va. 481 (1982); Claymont School Dist. V. Beck, 424 A.2d 662 (1980); Tutusville Iron Co. v. City of
New York, 207 N.Y. 203 (1912); Wilder v. Thrower, App. 337 So.2d 304 (1976); Prewitt v. Parkway
School Dist. 557 S.W.2d 232 (1977); Carbone v. Wverfield, 6 Ohio St.3d 212 (1983), Lovell v. School
Distr. No. 13 Coos County, 1 70 Or. 500 (1943); Rhea v. Grandview School Distr. No. 1& 2,763 P. 2d
1263 (1988).
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In some states, teachers may face a qualified immunity; in other states public
I lift
school teachers are subject to tort claims just as any other private school teacher. Still
other states provide a complete immunity for its teachers. The recent trend is for states to
reconsider the immunity of the principals, and even the classroom teachers. The state of
Georgia considers its teachers and principals to be immune, because it is believed that
they are otherwise likely to be treated hostile by juries. Whether the liability of the
teacher will be recognized by a court is a matter of state law. Some states provide that
while the teacher can be held liable, the school board must indemnify the teacher, except
for willful and wanton acts.
Basically, the same categories of tort claims for the teacher in the private school apply to the teacher in
the public school, and the same defenses apply as well. See Chapter I, section D of this paper.
'*' Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329 ( 1 980); Truelove v. Wilson, 1 59 Ga.App. 906 (1981). MICHAEL W.
LaMorte, School Law Cases and Concepts 385 (Allyn and Bacon ed. 6'*' ed.) (1998).
182 Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 2744.07 (1990).
Chapter II. Belgium
The law of education in Belgium has undergone major changes. First of all.
because of two systems, a private school and a public school system, the law in this
matter was complicated. One had to look in different statutes, some of general order and
others specific for school law.' ^ About twenty years ago. law of education gained more
interest. Official and semi-official codifications were published. Case law developed
and in the wake of that, law review articles increased. All this contributed to an easier
I 8^
accessibility and understanding of the law. The latest achievement, are new statutes ,
that will become effective on January 1, 1998, regulating both private and public schools.
These new^ statutes are a systematic codification of the existing law. However, there
exists still no general work for education law. Each article or paper deals with only
fragments of the matter. This does not contribute to the accessibility of the law.
A. General principles of the Belgian legal system
In order to have a better understanding of the Belgian school system, it is
important to provide a brief introduction to the various existing legal systems of the
'*' For the private schools, there was a specific statute about the organization of the private system, but the
rules for the rules related to the employment contracts were also to be found in the general statute on
employment contracts. For the public schools, not only there was a statute about the organization of the
system and the rights and duties of the teachers, but also each year, the Minister of Education promulgated
so called circulars. A cartload of rules existed, not even coordinated officially by the government. See also
R. Verstegen, De onderwuswetgeving in Vlaanderen. Een overzicht. [The Education Law in
Flanders. An Overview] 1 (Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen 1997) [hereinafter The Education Law in
Flanders. An Overview].
'** JOH.AN Heyvaert AND GuY Janssens, Onderwuszakboekje [Education Pocket] 7 (Kluwer Editorial
1998) [hereinafter Education Pocket].
'^^ Decreet van 27 maart 1991 betreffende de rechtspositie van bepaalde personeelsleden van
HET GEMEENSCHAPSONDERWIJS [DECREE CONCERNING THE LEGAL STATUS OF SOME EMPLOYEES OF
EDUCATION OF THE COMMU-NITY of March 27, 1991] [hereinafter the Decree of the Public Schools] and
DECREET van 27 MAART 1991 BETREFFENDE DE RECHTSPOSITIE VAN BEPAALDE PERSONEELSLEDEN VAN
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western world. The Belgian legal system belongs to what is traditionally seen as the civil
law system. Often for purposes of comparison the legal systems are divided into two
groups: the civil law system and the common law system. '^^' Within the civil law system
another subdivision exists between the French law and the German law. The French law
characterizes the Romanistic legal family, to which the Belgian law belongs.
In the civil law countries, most of the laws are codified. This codification not
only exists for public law, but also for private law. This is due to historic reasons that go
back to the Roman Law.'^^ Today the heart of private law in the Romanistic law lies in
the Code Civil of 1 804. This Code was promulgated after the French revolution and
placed highly considered values as freedom of contract, property and family in the
foreground. The Code was in use in several countries on the European continent. But
this Code does not only come forward with completely new ideas, ft is more a synthesis
of the different legal institutions that existed at that time. A major aim of this
codification of the legal institutions was that the code had to be in concise style. '^^ At
that time, the task of the legislature was seen as to build a framework, to be filled in by
the contracting parties. The legislature had to foresee everything by using simple and
general language. The result of this point of view is that the Civil Code contents very
general and compact rules. A major example of such rules is to be found in the articles
1382 to 1386. the articles that deal with tort law. Those articles are today very important
HET GESUBSIDIEERD ONDERWIJS [DECREE CONCERNING THE LEGAL STATUS OF SOME EMPLOYEES OF
Subsidized Education of March 27, 1991] [hereinafter the Decree of the Private Schools].
'**' ARTHUR Taylor von Mehren, An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law, The Civil
Law System 3 (Little, Brown and Company 2d ed. 1977).
1977).
88 cSee
Civil Law System 4 (Little, Brown and Company 2d ed. 1977).
1977).
'^^
1 KONR.A.D ZWEIGERT AND HEIN KOETZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 68 (North Holland
:
'^* Arthur Taylor von Mehren, An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law, The
'^^
1 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Koetz, An Introduction to Comparative Law 68 (North Holland
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for schools. Because of the general and concise language in the Civil Code, courts had lo
interpret these rules. In fact, it is not enough to consult the Civil Code. In order lo have
a correct application of a rule; a lawyer must look at case law and literature.
Belgium still uses the Civil Code today, as it was enacted in France."'^" However,
the case law in Belgium developed separately from the case law in France. This means
that a provision in the Civil Code can have a different meaning in the two countries. Yet
the Code does not live two separate lives. Even today a strong interaction exists between
the two countries. Belgian courts, interpreting civil law, still look to how certain articles
are interpreted by French case law.
Primarily the law in Belgium is enacted, so law can be found in statutes. Yet case
law is also very important. Because of the doctrine of separation of powers, the
legislative, the executive and judiciary power do not interfere. Thus, the judge cannot
challenge a statute, because he is considered as "the mouth of the legislature".''^^ But
when the statute is very general, it is important, even mandatory to look at the case law.
Often the statute is refined or even changed by the case law.'^**
Traditionally the areas of law are divided into public and private law. The private
law is that area of law where private parties can rule. The legislature is absent, except for
protective clauses or clauses to inhibit any violation of public order. The area of private
law consists of contracts, torts, commercial law and employment law. The other area of
'^° See also ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW,
The Civil Law System 54 (Little, Brown and Company 2d ed. 1977).
''''
1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT AND HEIN KOETZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 82 (North Holland
1977) citing the example that the French civil code spends 5 articles on the law of delict, whereas the
German civil code spends 31 articles on the same are of law.
''^- See Jacques Herbots, Contract Law in Belgium 30 (Kluwer 1995).
'^^ /J at 31.
A change or a broad interpretation however is not possible in criminal law. No penalty can be ordered
without a beforehand existing rule. This principle is embodied in the Belgian Constitution.
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law, the public law, covers constitutional law, administrative law\ employment law of
public employees, tax law and criminal law.
B. Features of the Belgian State
The Belgian State was a centralistic state until 1970.''^""' Several constitutional
reforms divided the state into regions, following the language parts. Now the Belgian
State has become a complex regional and communautaral state, with the Region standing
for an economic entity and the Community standing for a linguistic entity. The
Communities and the Regions fall more or less together. These entities might best be
compared to the member States of the United States of America. Each Community or
Region in Belgium has a parliament and a government, which has exclusive authority
granted through the Constitution to enact its own laws. Therefore each Region and
Community enacts its own statutes, which have "the same legal standing as the laws of
the national parliament". ^ There is no supremacy between the law of the different
bodies. There is almost no overlap of these laws, since the law of each Region or
Community should be enacted within the scope of its powers. These powers are well
defined. However, sometimes conflicts occur and in order to solve them, an Arbitration
Court was created. This young court, only created in 1983, carefully supervises if any of
the statutes exceeds the scope of granted powers. The composition of the Court mirrors
the political situation in Belgium: there is an equal number of French speaking and
Dutch speaking judges present, and judges are also chosen according to their adherence
to a political party. The judiciary powers remained federal. There are five Courts of
Appeal, with chambers that deal with civil, commercial, employment, criminal and youth
"^ Jacques Herbots, Contract Law in Belgium 31 (Kluwer 1995).
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cases on appeal. Just below are Tribunals of First Instance, who also have the same
divisions as the Court of Appeal. 1-inally on the lowest level are the Justices of Appeal.
The highest court in Belgium is the Cour de Cassation. It controls the decisions
of the lower courts by controlling whether these lower courts respected the law . It does
not look at the facts of a case, but only at the legal issue. Because of the distinction
between public and private law, a special court was created only to deal with
administrative law, the Conseil d'Etat. A public employee must go to an administrative
court for every issue that relates to his status as public employee, whereas a private
employee must go to other courts. All cases, except for some criminal cases, are decided
without jury trial. It is only the judge that will give an appreciation to the facts at stake
and to the related law.
The major sources of the law in Belgium are statutes, and contracts, but the
importance of the judicial decisions must not be underestimated. In Belgium, the
principle of the binding precedent does not exist, but uniformity in the judgments does
exist. Courts generally follow previous decisions, and lower courts generally follow the
decisions of the higher courts. Although not compelled to follow the decision of the
highest courts, let alone each other's decisions, judges tend to apply similar solutions to
similar settings.' ^ The practical explanation is that lower courts do not wish to have
their decisions reversed on appeal by the higher courts. The result is the legal certainty
and predictability for the parties. Case law is not considered in the Constitution as a
source of law, but it is an actual source of law. This is especially true in the field of
public and employment law. Public employees are not engaged by an employment
'^^ LUDO CORNELIS, PRINCIPES DU DROIT BELGE DE LA RESPONSABILITE EXTRA-CONTRACTUELLE
[Principles of Belgian Tort Law] 8 (Bruylant Maklu ed.) (1990) [hereinafter Principles of Belgian
Tort Law].
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contract, but appointed. Although the government tends to engage more on a contractual
basis, the rules are different from mere contract law, since the government is involved.
For example, in the field of disciplinary sanction, which is basically not regulated in
detail, case law clarified and determined a lot of rules. These rules, such as the right to
be heard, or to have a fair treatment, cannot be infringed anymore. In Belgium, a person
who works under an employment contract is either a private worker, or a public
employee. ''^^ In case of litigation, it is therefore important under what kind of relation a
worker falls. If he is a person under an employment contract, the civil employment court
has jurisdiction over him. A public employee has to turn to the administrative court in
case of a dispute with his employer.
C. School system in Belgium
The Belgian Constitution provides freedom of education. "^^^ This article exists
since the beginning of the existence of the Belgian State. It has historic reasons: since
before 1830 the legislature interfered exhaustively with education. Every party, present
at the creation of the Belgian state wanted to dispose of this. Therefore the article was
inserted in the Constitution. The principle of it was never questioned, but an overview of
the Belgian history makes clear, that its interpretation has been subject of vehement
'''^
Independent workers are not considered for the purpose of this thesis.
In fact, the legal system in Belgium recognizes two kinds of employees: the employee, working under a
contract and the public employee, working under a regulation. A regulation or statute is a special statute,
enacted by the government that regulates unilateral and in a general and impersonal way the duties and the
rights of the public employee. In contrast to a contract, it provides rigid rules and cannot be changed,
unless all parties - the government, the service and the unions - meet. An employment contract in the
private context, apart from some mandatory statutory requirements, is usually flexible. It has as major
characteristic that the employee obligates himself to work, the employer in return pays a wage, under the
authority of the employer. Hierarchy or authority is a major element in the employment relationship. The
employment contract has to be in writing and it is basically at will, with the exception that a teacher cannot
be dismissed for marriage, or pregnancy.
"°° Belg. Const., art. 24. For a thorough explanation, See Chapter II, Section E and note 205.
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discussions. "°' As in the United States, the organization of an educational system goes
back to the end of the 18"^ and 19"' century.""" More and more a professional school
system replaced a school system traditionally organized and provided by the Church.
The provision in the Constitution was a compromise between those who wanted to create
a secular education system and those who advocated a religiously inspired school system.
In fact, the reasons why Belgium separated from the Netherlands are not only related to
linguistic and economical reasons, but also to religious reasons. By avoiding any
inference of the state, catholic forces as well as secular parties saw their chance to shape
an educational system according to their conviction or opinion.""""^ Although this is not an
exclusive Belgian phenomenon, it might be typical for the Belgian situation that the
discussions still continue.
Freedom of education in Belgium has two meanings. According to the
Constitution, every person has a fundamental right to organize education. It also
embraces the freedom of a parent to send his or her children to a school of his or her
choice. It is the state, not the community that must guarantee that every parent has
indeed a free choice of school. The same article of the Constitution provides that every
person has indeed a right to education. ""^'^ Therefore the State has to organize neutral
public schools. ^ The public school must respect the philosophical, ideological and
See notes 207 and 217. The School Pact Law was in fact a statute that was the result of several
government changes, due to the fact that the different political parties could not agree on the school system
in Belgium.
°" See Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School Law, 19-41 (West 3"^
Ed.).
Jeffrey Tyssens, Vrijheidvan ondenvijs, schoolconflict en pacificatie in Belgie [Freedom of Education,
Schoolconflict and Pacification in Belgium] 2 TiJDSCHRlFT voorOnderwusrechten Onderwusbeleid
[T.O.R.B.] 91 (1994-95) [hereinafter Freedom of Education].
°^ Belg. Const., art. 24. See also R. Verstegen, THE EDUCATION Law in Flanders, An overview
(Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen 1997).
-"'' Belg. Const., art. 24.
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religious convictions of its pupils and parents." Thus the school and its teachers have at
all times to remain neutral. Not one single reference to a philosophical, ideological or
religious orientation is allowed.
In the same article, the Constitution guarantees that the access to education is free.
Interpreted by the Court of Arbitration, it means that the elementary school - the private
and the public - has to be free. For high schools there exists a distinction: private schools
may charge a tuition. Yet this tuition may not rise quicker than the cost of living."
Since the creation of the Belgian state, two education systems exist: a public
school system and a private school system. Although regulated by similar statutes, each
system has its owti particularities. The most striking difference is that teachers who work
in the public school are public employees, whereas teachers in a private school work
under a private employment agreement. This difference is significant for the teachers.
The acquisition of certain rights, such as tenure, the tort liability and the authority of the
courts are different.
D. Sources of law
Just as for other areas of the law, the number of statutes and regulations with
respect to education increases and becomes more specific. The Reform of the State
contributed to the complexity of the education law. Today each Community promulgates
its own rules in educational matters. This leads to growing case law and related
jurisprudence.
It is indeed since 1988 that education itself is no longer a federal matter, but a
matter of the Communities. But until January 1^' of 1989, education was a national
matter. Education was. as in France organized in centralistic way. This no longer met
-°^ SCHOOLPACTWET [SCHOOL PACT Law] of May 29, 1959.
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the needs of the real situation, because of the differences between the Northern and the
Southern part of Belgium. Long before the Reform of the State, the legislature already
created two Ministers of Education in one national Department.' As the Reform of the
State was achieved, more authority was given to the Communities." In the present
situation every community can promulgate every statute related to education, except for
the beginning and the end of the compulsory school attendance, minimum requirements
for obtaining degrees and pensions.""" The law of private employment contracts also
remains in the realm of the federal legislature.
Thus the federal Statute of June 29, 1983 fixes the beginning and the end of the
compulsory attendance. The minimum requirements for obtaining a degree are also
subject of a federal statute. But the federal statute only provides a framework, in order to
maintain some uniformity in the country. It means that the duration of the schools in
Flanders or Walloon cannot be changed, unless the federal legislature decides to. Every
school level is in accordance to a certain period of time. Elementary school and high
school take each six years. The substantive requirements, such as subject matters and
course credits, are a community matter. Although the subject matter may vary from
community to community, the Belgian State opted for equivalence of degrees. The
degree of the Northern part is equal to the degree of the Southern part.""
""
-°^ Trib. Arbitrage, May 7, 1992, no. 33/92.
^"^ R. Verstegen, L. Veny, W. Rauws and D. Deli, Actuele vraagstukken van onderwijsrecht
[Current Questions of Education Law] 8 (Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen 1997) [hereinafter Current
Questions of Education Law].
-'° JOHAN Heyvaert AND GUY JANSSENS, EDUCATION PoCKET 7 (Kluwer Editorial 1998).
Belg. Const., art 127. See also Koen Brynaert, De minimale rechten van het overheidspersoneel [The
Minimal Rights ofPublic Employees] 4 TiJDSCHRIFT VOOR BESTUURSWETENSCHAPPEN EN PUBLIEK RJECHT
["T.B.P.] 782 (1998) [hereinafter The Minimal Rights of Public Employees].
-'- Raf Verstegen, The Education Law in Fl.anders. An Overview 15 (Kluwer
Rechtswetenschappen 1997).
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Matters related to retirement remain federal. On this issue the Constitution is not
ver>- clear, because only one general phrase states that regulations of retirement remain
federal. However, all the rest of the legislative power in employment issues are no
longer federal."''' It means that the Flemish Community has the authority to regulate the
statute of its employees."^'"* This has been confirmed by the constitutional Court, the Cour
d' Arbitrage."'"^ The result is contradictory, on the one hand the Flemish Community is
competent for employee regulations, on the other hand, the federal state takes care of
retirement issues.
The federal state is no longer competent to enact statutes or regulations
determining the status of teachers. It leads to a complex situation: private school teachers
are private employees and the rules controlling their employment contracts remain
federal. Yet. the law applicable to the public schools belongs to the competency of the
Flemish Community. This as explained previously, is only partially true.
The substantive rules for the organization of the schools and the content of the
matters are in two statutes with almost the same title: the Decree of March 27. 1991
regulating the position of the members of the staff of the schools of the state and the
Decree of March 27, 1991 regulating the position of the members of the staff of the
subsidized schools. '^ The statutes have a general part and define what a teacher is, fix
the content of the task of a teacher, as well as the conditions to obtain a teaching position
and tenure. For the public school teachers, the statute also regulates the disciplinary
"'^ This is valid except for the statute of June 14, 1978 which regulates employee contracts.
-'•' Koen Brynaert, The Minimal Rights ofPublic Employees 4 T.B.P. 782 (1998).
'^ Trib. Arbitrage, January 27, 1993, no. 6/93.
"^ Decreet van 27 maart 1991 betreffende de rechtspositie van bepaalde personeelsleden van
HET GEMEENSCHAPSONDERWUS [DECREE CONCERNrNG THE LEGAL STATUS OF SOME EMPLOYEES OF
Education OF THE Community of March 27. 1991] [hereinafter the Decree of the Public Schools] and
Decreet van 27 maart 1991 betreffende de rechtspositie van bepaalde personeelsleden van
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rules. In the more specific part the statute defines the structure of the public education.
The Decrees contain more than 200 articles and provide a drastic change in the
organization of education. The major reason was to abandon the rigid procedures laid
down until then in the previous statutes. Now the focus is more on the organizing
authorities, which are local bodies, in contrast to the uniform rules emanating from one
secretary of state. The purpose both for private and public schools consisted of procuring
more autonomy to the school boards.
E. Private schools
The Belgian Constitution guarantees that every person is entitled to organize
education according to his views. Every person has the right to choose a school to attend.
The state has the obligation to guarantee a free choice of school for the parents. This
guarantee means that the state organizes its own system and that the state subsidizes a
private organized school."' According to the Cour d" Arbitrage, this is necessar>' since
the legislature wants to preserve control over essential aspects of the education, such as
HET GESUBSIDIEERD ONDERWIJS [DECREE CONCERNING THE LEGAL STATUS OF SOME EMPLOYEES OF
Subsidized Education of March 27, 1991] [hereinafter the Decree of the Private Schools]
"'
In fact this article of the Constitution is rewritten. Belgium has a long histor\' of regularly returning
clashes between those groups who want a secular and neutral state organized education system and those
who advocate a religious inspired school system. This tension assumed such vast dimensions that
historians, politicians or lawyers refer to it as the school war. The school war arrived at a peak in the
fifties. With the "Schoolpeace statute" of May 29, 1959 the legislature tried to elaborate a compromise.
This statute foresaw that parents should have the absolute guarantee that they could send their children to
any school, either public or private. Since the state had to provide the existence of this right, this freedom
of choice of school implied that the state had to subsidize private organized schools. This vision was of
course one of the components of the so called school war. The statute recognized the right of private
initiative to organize a school. The state has then the obligation to realize this private initiative. The right
to receive a subsidy was seen as a task of public interest. This statute has been superceded by the Reform
of the State, the rewriting of the Constitution and the promulgation of the Decree. However, the principles
of the School peace statute remain good law, because they were reproduced in the Constitution. Case law
explaining these principles are therefore not overruled. Matters are not settled yet, because the private
schools claim a complete equal treatment for the subsidizing of their schools. Not only have the teachers to
be paid by the state, but also the buildings and more general the operation costs. See Jeffrey Tyssens,
Freedom ofEducation 2 T.O.R.B. 91 (1994-95) and R.AF Verstegen, The Education Law in Flanders. An
Overview 20 (Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen 1997).
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organizing, recognition and subsidizing over the two systems." Therefore, when the
State imposes a form of quality control, this same state must pro\ idc for the private
school some sort of funding in order to meet the standards. This ruling is once again
inspired by the constitutional freedom of education.
Private schools are governed by the authority of a board of trustees. The majority
of the private schools are catholic, although a few other religions created their schools
also. However, those protestant. Islamic, Israeli and non-confessional schools form a
minority."'^ As a rule of thumb, private schools are catholic schools and they are
governed by diocesan authorities, orders of priesthood and congregations, local school
committees or other associations. They all fall under the coordination of Secretariat of
the Catholic Education. This Secretariat sets the policies to be followed by all the
catholic schools, represents all the local private schools""^ at the level of the Minister of
Education. The unions and all other groups involved in the catholic schools, the
representatives of parents, catholic authorities and the teachers, meet at the behest of the
Secretariat."""'
Since the Decree of 1997, the private schools are under the authority of the
administration of the school or organizing body. Such an administration can be a natural
person (which is not often the case), or more likely, an organization. Because of the
responsibilities involved, the organization has to be a fully legal, recognized
organization. A school in Belgium is a pedagogical unit, under the authority of a
principal. When several schools are under the authority of one organization, the statute
-'* Trib. Arbitrage May 7, 1992, nr. 33/92.
' It is about only one school per other religion for the whole Belgian country.
^J°
Decree of 25 February 1997.
"' Those other groups can be: after school sports clubs, cultural organizations and youth clubs.
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speaks of a school community. The organizing authority of such a community is not
the same as a principal. Remaining under the same authority, each school will have its
own principal.
1 . Employment Contract
There is still no unanimity about the kind of relationship a teacher in a private
school has with his employer. The task description will mostly be in general terms. And
since it is the contract that rules the relationship, parties are free to interpret it during the
execution of it. Within the context of a private school there is a special situation - the
parties may decide what will be included in the contract. The employer in general has to
follow the requirements stipulated in the statute that deal with the employment
relationship in the private school. But because of the existence of this Decree, which
provides the substantial part of the contract from qualification of the teacher to
disciplinary actions, much confusion about the status of the private school teacher exists.
Since the courts did not seem to agree upon whether teachers fell under a mere
employment contract or not. the cases suggested several solutions. First, some authors
suggested that the way of regulating the situation of the private school teachers was so
similar to that of public school teachers, that private school teachers should be treated as
public employees. ~~^ They arrived at this result because on the one hand, the rights and
the duties of teachers in a private school are very similar to those of teachers in public
schools. Moreover, they suggest, that because the government subsidizes the private
schools through direct payment of the wages of the teachers that teachers are therefore
— Decree of February 25, 1997.
-' LuDO Veny, De rechtspositieregeling van het personeel in het gesubsidieerd vru onderwus:
NAAR RECHTSONZEKERHEID? [THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE STAFF MEMBERS IN THE SUBSIDIZED PRIVATE
Schools] 83 (MAKLU ed.) (1994) [hereinafter The Legal Position in Subsidized Private Schools].
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public employees."""' As a matter of fact, since the private schools provide a public
service, private schools are to be considered corporations of functional public service."
But these arguments have never been adopted by the lower courts. The higher courts
seem now willing to see private school teachers as private employees. Private schools
are indeed quasi public corporations. But there is a separation between what the school
provides, and in how the school deals with other parties."" In dealing with third parties.
the corporation remains entirely private. The formal contract with a teacher therefore is
in all material respects a private employment contract.
Still other authors make mention of a semi-public employee character of the
relationship, " and a third proposal is to look only at the form of this relationship, not at
the content. The relationship between a teacher and the organizing authority for whom
he works is a contractual one. Since the organizing authority of a private school is a
person of private law. there are no governing regulations because only state bodies have
the power to enact regulations. A private person can only enter a contractual
relationship. The legislative history reveals that the constitutional legislature wanted
public and private schools to be similar, but differences between the two school systems
must remain. The Belgian French Community clearly opted for a contractual relationship
--"* Raf Verstegen, Het statuut van het personeel in het vrij onderwus [The Regulations of the
Staff in the Prjvate Schools] 9 (Maarten Kluwer ed.) (1980) [hereinafter The Regulations of the Staff
in the Private Schools].
"' In Belgium, a public service is created by the state and provides some sort of public service. The
corporations created by the state follow specific rules, the most striking one being that they can be change
or even abolished at all times. Some corporations are not created by the state, yet they provide a public
service. For the service they offer, they do follow the rules valid for a pure public service. However in all
their other dealings, they fall under private law. These corporations are called functional public services.
See BLACK'S Law Dictionary 895 (6'^ ed. 1990) (In the United States these corporations are called quasi
public corporations).
"^ Conseil d'Etat, March, 17, 1992, no. 39.024.
"^ See Raf Verstegen, The Regulations of the Staff in the Private Schools 8 (Maarten Kluwer
ed.)(1980).
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"^ *) tt
between teacher and private school.""" This solution is in accord what the lower courts
always have decided and what has been followed b\' the Cour dc Cassation." In a
decision of 1993 the Cour de Cassation stated that " although the teachers are under
regulations, their relationship is not created by these regulations, since it was created by
an employment contract'.""^" The term "regulation" can have two meanings. One
meaning is the unilateral, general and impersonal rules that regulate the relationship
between public employees and public authority. The other is a set of rules that differ
from the normal employment contract, and that are fixed by a private corporation."
This question is not purely philosophical, since according to one's status different
courts have different jurisdiction. Also, different statutes regulate the employment
relationship. For example, disciplinary rules differ: a public school can transfer its
employees as a disciplinar\' measure, whereas a private school cannot. But the most
important difference between a private and a public school teacher is the applicability of
the tort liability rules.
In a normal employee - employer setting, the employee knows the description of
the task because it is spelled out under the employment agreement. But as long as the
employer does not change the essential functions of the job. it can require the employee
to change some task descriptions." " In the education sector, the teacher will indeed
receive a briefjob description in his contract, and every year these job descriptions will
"^ W. Rauws, De rechtspositie van het personeel van het vrue onderwijs in beweging [The
Legal Position of the Staff of the Private Schools in Motion] 94 (Kluwer ed.) ( 1 997) [hereinafter
The Legal Position in Motion].
--' Cass. June 25, 1979.
The exact text goes as following: "... hoewel die personeelsleden aldus onder statuut zijn geplaatst. hun
dienstbetrekking niet statutair geregeld is, nu zij uit een arbeidsovereenkomst is ontstaan". Cass. October
4, 1993.
-^' Cass. November 30. 1992.
'^' A change of the conditions so important as to alter the Job function as a whole is according to Belgian
law an implied declaration of discharge. See Willy Van EECK.HOUTTE. Social Compendium
Employment Law, 1282 (Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen Belgie) (1998).
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be fixed by the school board, in consuhation with the teacher. The changes, however,
are not so substantial as to alter the terms of the contract. The changes of description
generally relate to the teacher's tasks and duties and the way they have to be performed.
They may also contain specific goals related to the teacher, such as the obligation of the
teacher to obtain additional training.
"''"* These descriptions have to be approved by the
teacher.
It might seem redundant to mention that a teacher must have the appropriate
degree in order to be able to work as such. Before the first statute"^^ regulated the
necessary requirements to be met for all private and public schools, private schools often
considered the freedom of education a proxy to hire to their discretion any person,
whether or not certified. "^^ A condition for the teacher's salar>' is a proof of capability."
This proof of capability consists of a basic degree, and if necessary it can be completed
with a certificate of pedagogical ability or with a number of years of experience. The
basic degree must be in a field in which the teacher teaches. Therefore the degree can be
-) -5 Q
specific or general.' Holders of such proofs of capability are eligible for appointment,
or in American terms, eligible for tenure. If for some reason, the organizing authority
finds a teacher does not have the required degree, it is allowed to hire someone who has a
similar degree. This could be a teacher, without the required degree, but presenting a
sufficient number of years of experience. But the organizing authority must first declare
that no eligible teacher was available. Hiring is limited to one school year and this
"" Decree of the private schools.
•'^ JoHAN Heyvaert AND GuY Janssens, EDUCATION POCKET 9 1 (Kluwer Editorial) ( 1 998).
-'^ The first statute dates from March 20, 1959.
-^^ Raf Verstegen, The Regulations of the Staff in the Private Schools 12 (Maarten Kluwer ed.)
(1980).
'"^ Decree of the private schools.
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teacher can never obtain tenure. If for some reason a school hires a teacher without the
appropriate certificate and another candidate with a certificate applied for the Job. the
latter has a right of redress."
The salary for all private and public school teachers is fixed by statute, and it
increases with seniority. Every two years a teacher can obtain a raise of salary, according
to the age and the seniority of the teacher." " Seniority is determined by the respective
school system. Seniority obtained within different private schools is cumulative but a
teacher switching from private to public school or vice versa will have to begin anew
building up seniority." Moreover, seniority while in temporarily status will not count
toward seniority while working under tenure.""*" The statute also distinguishes between a
teacher that has a full school year of service and one that has an incomplete year. But as
long as the incomplete performance does not extend for more than half of a complete
year of service, it will count as a full year for purposes of seniority."
^
Since 1991. the statute regulates the career of the private school teacher."
A teacher will first be appointed temporarily. The teacher has to be a subject of one of
the member states of the European Union, he must enjoy full civil and political rights""*'.
"'^ A person that has a degree in mathematics will be allowed to teach physics, this is a sufficient degree.
A person that wants to teach French must have a degree in French, this is a required degree. See JOHAN
Heyvaert and Guy Janssens, Education Pocket 44 (Kluwer Editorial) ( 1 998).
-^'/d'. at 45.
''"Id. at 47.
'"Mat 49.
""*" Decree of March 27, 1991. Decreten 27 maart 1991 rechtspositie personeelsleden
gemeenschapsonderwijs en rechtspositie personeelsleden in het gesubsidieerd onderwijs.
" ' At a certain moment, there were more teachers applying for a job than places were available. These
persons had first to fill in the gaps, replacing teachers that were on leave. The days or months achieved
were counted, until a full service year was accomplished.
'"' Decree of the Private Schools.
To enjoy full political and civil rights in Belgium means that a person does not have a criminal record.
It is possible in Belgium to take away those as part of the penalty. The political rights consist of the right
to vote and the right to pay taxes. The civil rights consist of the right to contract, inherit, and to wear all
titles bom with or gathered during live.
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he must be a holder of the required degree, he must meet the Hnguistic standards" and
he must comply with the draft.
A person cannot commence employment without procuring a medical certificate.
The school may refuse to hire someone who is not fit to teach. This means that the
teacher has to be able to perform the job. It also implies that the school may refuse
747
someone whose health condition would represent a danger to the health of the students.
The school is not allowed to appoint someone who does not meet these minimum
requirements.
There is no central, organized form of application. A candidate must seek
employment at each particular school. Yet, the school must always first offer the vacant
positions to the teachers who have acquired tenure, but who are currently not teaching
• •
''48
because of a shortage of positions."
All the candidates for a teaching position, teachers without seniority or tenured
teachers are classified into two groups. The group of tenured teachers has priority over
the other. Within a group however there is no rule of priority; the school board has
discretion to hire a particular candidate. A teacher who has already taught in the school
with the vacant position also has priority to obtain an open position at this same school
over someone who comes in from the outside. A candidate, who is not able to accept the
position because of illness, work accident, maternity leave, or nursing leave, guards her
priority rights.^ The replacement of a teacher on leave does not follow these rules,
however the statute did not foresee damages in a case where the authorizing authority
"^^ Since Belgium consists of three different language groups, each person from the other part must pass an
official language test in order to be accepted to the other language group. This is even valid for a someone
who teaches French or German.
-*'' JOHAN Heyvaert AND GUY Janssens, EDUCATION POCKET 59 (Kluwer Editorial) ( 1 998).
-^^ Decree of March 27, 1991.
-'''
Decree of March 27, 1991. See Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 707 F.2d 1005 (1983).
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ignores a teacher's right of priority. In general employment law, reinstatement is no
sanction. Not hiring implies that the employer did not want to hire this particular teacher,
thus the school cannot be compelled to hire against its will.^"^^ More likely, the damages
will be in the form of payment. The courts have confirmed this."'
The school board has the obligation to inform the members of the staff who are
eligible for a tenured teaching position, of all the available positions. The teacher then
must apply for ever>' single vacant position."""
The Decree of March 27, 1991 regulating the position of teachers in the private
school specifies the duties of a teacher, such as to promote at all times the private school
system or to adhere to a religious conviction. The school board may specify the
obligations emanating from the religious character of the private school."'" Such
obligations have to be communicated in writing before commencement of employment.
To comply with this requirement, the school has the choice of writing the obligations in
each contract or in a manual.
2. Duties on the Job
Basically the task of a teacher consists of the following duties: to defend the
interests of the school, the school board, the Secretariat and the students; to perform the
job personally and punctually; display impeccable behavior, not only in the classroom,
but also when dealing with parents or in public; to avoid anything that could damage the
public's confidence or hurt the honor or dignity of the profession."'"^ A teacher also
cannot accept gifts, donations, rewards or any other advantage, nor can he divert his
--° Willy Van Eeckhoutte, Social Compendium Employment Law, 1027 (Kluwer
Rechtswetenschappen Belaie) (1998).
251 W. Rauws, The Legal Position in Motion 102 (Kluwer ed.) (1997).
Decree oft!
A major ex;
public school.
'^^
the Private Schools.
" " ample of such an incompatibility is a private school teacher who sends his children to a
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authority for commercial or political aims. Me also has the obligation of official secrecy.
But it is unclear whether this obligation also contains a prohibition against whistle-
blowing. Probably internal reporting is required before a teacher could start blowing the
whistle publich . Fven if whistle-blowing is acceptable, the teacher has to be cautious
not to \iolate the obligation of secrecy. This is One line to walk.
A pri\ ate school has a religious orientation, and may ask its teachers to support
this. Ihus. the school could require that the teacher's conduct be irreproachable both, in
the classroom and in private life. It may impose certain duties and obligations to support
its orientation. Such an incompatibility does not have to be unlawful. Some perfectly
lawful acti\ ities may be prohibited in a particular school."""'"^ For instance, in the fifties,
contracts often had a dissolving condition in case of maiTiage or pregnancy, especially
tor tenialc teachers.''^ After this had been declared illegal by the Cour de Cassation.
pri\ ate schools could no longer require this. But often, the school boards require a
teacher's private life to conform to with the Roman Catholic orientation. The private
schools generalh do not welcome di\ orce. extramarital relations, extra-marital
households, homosexualit) or abortion. In most cases, teachers ha\ e to comph with the
policy of the private schools at all times. If they do not. they are either not hired or asked
to resign or even discharged. But since the Decree of U)^)7. tlie statute now explicitly
pro\ides that facts from pri\ate life that ha\e no incidence on the relationship of teacher
to pupil or to the life of the school ma> not be taken into account by the school board.
Thus, they cannot be a reason tor disciplining a teacher. This is. of course, a tine
balance, since the statute talks about the relationship between a teacher and a pupil. This
"' Dn Rii or 1 111 Priv.mi Sciiooi s.
-" W. RMws. I'lir; Leg.al Position in Motion 104 (Kluwcr cd.) O'-^^^").
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relationship refers to the role with which the teacher must comply. He has at all times to
be an example, which stands for a conduct that is without any reproach. The role
encompasses more than the quality of education. As in the United States, the life of the
teacher beyond the school gate affects his ability to teaching. Since the regulation in the
statue is vague, it will inevitably lead to discussion and perhaps controversy.
Since the teacher has to prove his loyalty to the school, the question arises
whether he may send his children to a school of another conviction or to a public school.
It is not clear where to draw the line between facets of his life that are entirely private and
facets that are not. On the one hand, requiring the teacher to send his children to a certain
school would be contrary to the Constitution, on the other hand, it would fall into the
contractual obligation of loyalty.
3. Duties of the Job
How far can the school authority go in asking a teacher to adhere to a certain way
of life? Requiring loyalty to a school and its support for religious orientation could
conflict with the right to be a member of a political party, or a religious, philosophical or
ideological group. Since the aim of some groups is to attract the public's attention the
school may have an interest in the teacher's private life. But these rights are fundamental
rights, embodied in the Belgian Constitution. When voting the Decree, the Court advice
wrote: "The obligations or prohibitions have to be related to the activities of the teachers
at school. No way of life, no engagement, no adherence to any political, ideological.
-^^ Willy Van Eeckhoutte, Social Compendium Employment Law 1042 (Kluwer
Rechtswetenschappen Belgie) (1998).
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religious or philosophical may be prohibited". "^^ The problem is that the court did not
come to this decision in a judgment, but in mere advice to the legislature.
T c u
A new dimension of the discussion has recently emerged."" Given the specific
orientation of the private schools, can they refuse to hire non-Catholic teachers'.^ At the
moment, in Belgium the citizens of Islam are a seizable group. In addition there are
immigrants from Northern Africa or Turkey. Projects of have been set up to accelerate
the integration of these groups into the Belgian society. One of these projects is that
persons may work for a period. This includes teaching in the public schools and in the
private schools. For this project, all schools received a substantial amount of financing.
However, most of the teachers employed temporarily under the project were not of the
same conviction of the private schools, so the schools did not renew the contracts of the
Islamics after the subsidies were over. The Minister of Education then threatened to
withdraw all subsidies from the private schools. The statute was subsequently amended
to provide that from now on. private schools could not exclude candidates of another
religion, such as the Muslim religion. Under this amendment, most private schools
renewed the contracts of the Muslim teachers. Some private schools, though, thought
this amendment unconstitutional, since it conflicted with freedom of religion clause.
They then brought suit under this theory and contrary to ruling that the Freedom of
Education clause would allow the schools to hire whom they like, the Court focused the
discussion on privacy. It is reasoned that religion is a matter of privacy and the schools
The exact text goes as following: "[D]eze verplichtingen betrekking moeten hebben op de activiteiten
van de personeelsleden in de ondervvijsinrichting. Geen enkele leefwijze, geen enkel engagement of
politieke, ideologische, religieuze of filosofische aanhorigheid, [...] kan hen verboden worden". Conseil
dTtat. Printed Pieces, nr. 61/1, 1992. S'ee W. Rauws, THE LEGAL POSITION IN MOTION 104 (Kluwer ed.)
(1997).
See Adriaan Overbeeke, Multi-etnisch schoolteam, vrije personeelskeuze en gelijke behandeling. [Multi
Ethnic School Team, Free Choice ofPersonel and Equal Treatment] TiJDSCHRIFT VOOR ONDERWIJSRECHT
EN Onderwijsbeleid [T.O.R.B.], 1 - 20 September 1998-99. [hereinafter Multi Ethnic Schoolteam]
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may not treat job candidates unequally. As long as the teacher follows the delineated
tasks during school hours, the school cannot interfere with that teacher's private
1- • 259
religion.
Each teacher has two persons who evaluate him. one of whom is always the
principal. This evaluation follows the job description. At least three times a year, the
teacher will be evaluated. The unions and the school board, including the principal of the
school where the teacher works, agree upon how the evaluations will be performed. This
evaluation is detailed and the teacher receives a grade. Appeal from the grade is not
possible, unless the teacher is given a grade of "failed". Failing has severe consequences.
For a temporar>' teacher, it means that he will be discharged. A tenured teacher will be
reevaluated the following year. Three failures in a row will lead to dismissal for a
tenured teacher."
The only way a tenured teacher can be disciplined is through certain limited
measures. After all, the purpose of tenure is that the teacher cannot be discharged easily.
The statute provides disciplinary powers, but only for tenured teachers. A temporary
teacher enjoys less protection. The statute provides a variety of measures, from simple
blame or a reprimand, to suspension with or without salary. The heaviest sanction is the
discharge of the teacher. When a disciplinary case is pending, the school board may
suspend the teacher provisionally. Disciplinary measures resemble much a criminal trial
with some differences. In a criminal case, one has to prove that the defendant is guilty.
This is not required in a disciplinary case. Also, the people competent for pronouncing
-^'^
Trib. Arbitrage, April 1, 1998. no. 34/98.
-^° Decree of the Private Schools.
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the measure do not have to be different from those investigating the case." ' Ikii
disciplinary measures also offer a protection, since a tenured teacher cannot be dismissed
at the school board's sole discretion. Although the rules are not as stringent as in
criminal cases, case law has interpreted how such disciplinary measures can be inflicted.
For instance the teacher has the right to be informed before the measure is undertaken,
the teacher must be given a right of access and the right to a hearing and a sentencing
behind closed doors. The teacher is heard before a decision is reached and the teacher
must have the opportunity to answer to all the disciplinary charges. He also has a
statutory right of appeal. A counsel of appeal that consists of an independent president,
representatives of the employer and the employee hears the case. The representatives
have all to be recognized by the government."^" The representatives of the employees are
unions.
When the school, through its principal, who always initiates the disciplinary
procedure and the organizing authority, who finally imposes the sanctions, wants to
discipline a teacher while a criminal suit is pending against that teacher, they need not
await the outcome of the criminal suit."
4. Employee Benefits
It would lead us too far a field to examine the system of social security in
Belgium, but it is worth noting that teachers have a right to fully paid sick leave
consisting of 30 days per 12 months worked, fully paid by the employer."^"^ They also
receive a child surcharge, for ever>' biological or adopted child living in their
-^' See INGRID OPDEBEEk, TUCHTRECHT IN LOICALE BESTUREN [DISCIPLINARY MEASURES IN LOCAL
AUTHORITIES] 7 (Die Keure ed.) (1993).
^" JOHAN Heyvaert AND GUY JANSSENS, EDUCATION POCKET 85 (Kluwer editorial) ( 1 998).
^" INGRID Opdebeek., Id. at 21
.
-^^ Algemene Besluitwet van 28 december 1944 [General Statute of December 28, 1944].
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household. "^"^ In addition to that, all holidays, up to the amount of 105 days per year, are
fully paid by the employer."^^ In case of work accident or accident incurred on the way
to or from school, they are integrally covered by their employer. The teacher is entitled
to compensation for all medical expenses, an annuity in case of consolidated total or
partial incapacity, and to sick leave. A tenured teacher enjoys a sick leave for the period
he cannot perform his job, even if this exceeds the period of 30 days to which he is
entitled. During this absence, he receives his full last year's salary. A temporar\' teacher
may receive up to 90 % of his last year's salary for one year. Moral and esthetical
damages will not be compensated."
A teacher is covered during school time as well for all extra school activity.
However, the coverage for accidents in the work place, or on the way to or from the
workplace only extents to activities related to the job of the teacher, and the principal
must have assigned this outside activity."
5. Pregnancy
There is no such statute as Title VII or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in
Belgium. This does not mean that a female teacher has no protection at all; she enjoys
protection that has its basis in statutes." Courts have completed the protection in case
law, so that the protection is deep-rooted in the Belgian legal system."^' In cases of
hiring, the school cannot discriminate between male and female candidates, since this
""' JOHAN Heyvaert AND GUY Janssens, EDUCATION PocKET 243 (Kluwer Editorial) (1998).
'''
Id. at 324.
267 Of course, if the accident is due to the act of a third party, the employer will reclaim the advanced
expenses from this third party.
-^^ JoHAN Heyvaert AND Guy Janssens, Education Pocket 348 (Kluwer Editorial) (1998).
-^''
Id. at 364.
These protective statutes are the result of a tradition, particular for the European continent, of struggle of
employees and unions for more protection of the employee in general dating from the end of the 19'*'
Century. See Els Witte, Politieke Geschiedenis van Belgie, (VUB Press ed.) (1998) [Political History
of Belgiuml.
69
272
would violate the Constitution. "^^^ Until recently, it has not been the subject of case law.
In the past, plaintiffs have claimed that the hiring of another candidate was not founded
on objective grounds. It was unlikely that a plaintiff would use the argument of gender-
based discrimination. Currently, the statute explicitly provides that female teachers,
eligible for hiring or tenure, in the condition of pregnancy or maternity leave preserve all
their rights" , which is in contrast to the law of the United States."
The protection starts as soon as the teacher communicates to the principal the fact
of her pregnancy. There is no retroactive protection. This has the consequence that the
teacher must communicate her condition has early as possible. The protection is twofold:
the teacher cannot be terminated because of pregnancy or any related medical condition,
and the teacher has the right to take 15 weeks of maternity leave." ^ The employer must
maintain her position; he can only hire an interim replacement."
Yet the protection is not absolute, because under certain circumstances, discharge
remains possible. Such was the case when the teacher received severance before she
informed the principal of her pregnancy. Thus the discharge remained valid, but the
severance was suspended for the time of the maternity leave." Generally, the employer
does not have to specify the motives behind the termination, but in this case the employer
was to specify the motives. The employer may only terminate for reasons unrelated to
the pregnancy. The employer bears the burden of proof." Yet, for a tenured teacher.
"' See supra WiLLY Van Eeckhoutte, Social Compendium Employment Law 1042 (Kluwer
Rechtswetenschappen Belgie) (1998).
'^' The Belgian Constitution has consecrates one article to equality: all people shall be equal.
Belg. Const., art. 11.
'''' Decree of the Private Schools.
-^•' Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 707 F.2d 1005 (1983).
-" Decree of the Prjvate Schools.
-^^ JOHAN Heyvaert AND GuY Janssens, EDUCATION P0CK.ET 3 1 (Kluwer Editorial) ( 1 998). See
California Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
-''''
Johan Heyvaert and Guy Janssens, Education Pocket 3 1 1 (Kluwer Editorial) (1998).
-''^ Johan Heyvaert and Guy Janssens, Education Pocket 3 1 (Kluwer Editorial) ( 1 998).
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there is no dismissal possible without a disciplinary sanction. This means that teachers
are fully protected against dismissal.
The second prong of the protection is the maternity leave. Any pregnant teacher
has the right to take seven weeks of absence before the childbirth and eight weeks after.
The teacher must take at least one week before the childbirth and at least eight weeks
after the childbirth. She has a choice for the other six weeks, but she cannot take them at
different times. They have to be taken because of the pregnancy and childbirth. It is not
possible to renounce to this right.
It is unclear whether abortion generates the same protection as childbirth.^ Until
now, no case dealt with this. However, the statute provides the same protection for
miscarriage as for childbirth. During the fifteen weeks of leave, full salary is guaranteed.
It is permissible to exceed the statutory fifteen weeks, but the teacher is then not entitled
to salary. A new development is the possibility for nursing leave. The mother must take
this immediately after the maternity leave and she can take up to three months of unpaid
leave.
"^^^
In the private employment situation, unionization, collective bargaining and
strikes have had a long tradition. However, collective bargaining process of the private
school is somewhat different from the process in regard to other private employment.
Since the government is an important party because its role in funding and controlling the
schools, the bargaining takes place at the highest level of the coordinating organization
which controls all private, catholic schools. Within this level, the coordinating
organization of all the schools is the employer and represents them all. The Minister of
Education presides over the bargaining. The unions represent all the private school
-^'' See Michael W. LaMorte, School Law, Cases and Concepts 238 (Allyn and Bacon) (1998)
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teachers (except for the non-CathoHc schools). The private schools have not faced as
many strikes as the public schools have, but the private school teachers certainly have the
right to strike. However, within the private schools, all bargaining parties engage more
in consultation. The result of the meetings are binding for all the school employers and
employees, regardless of their adherence to a union.
F. Public schools
The flip side of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of education is that the
state provides schools as well. The public school was originally organized by the state,
more specifically, the Minister of Education. Since this same Minister had authority over
both school systems, it was considered a conflict of interest when dealing with the private
school system to be both organizer and promoter of the official school system and its
controlling authority.
Because of this perception, in the 1980"s. the Minister delegated its power of
organization and promotion of the public school system to a board of trustees. This
Board of Trustees, the "Autonome Raad van het Gemeenschapsonderwijs (ARGO)""
[Autonomous Board of the Education of the Community], consists of a Central Council
and the local school boards."^' Both control the functioning of the schools, but the local
school boards have only an advising capacity. Since 1998, the structure and organization
has again been modified. Now, the public schools have three levels of administration.
At the local level is the individual school, at the intermediate level are a group of schools,
called the school community, and at a central level are all the public schools. The
'^° JOHAN Heyvaert AND GuY Janssens, EDUCATION POCKET 3 19 (Kluwer Editorial) (1998).
-^' BIJZONDER DECREET OF 19 DECEMBER 1988 [SPECIAL DECREE OF DECEMBER 19, 1988].
BiJZONDER Decreet OF 14 juli 1998 [Special Decree of July 14, 1998].
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intermediate level can be as large as a county, while the central level may be as large as
-) u 1
the whole region of Flanders."
Unlike the private schools, which are complete functioning entities and have
authority to do their own hiring and firing, the public school only has pedagogical
functions. The principal has to coach and evaluate his team, define the individual job
descriptions and tasks, and make proposals for tenure." He is appointed by the
intermediate level, which also considers the proposals of the principal. This intermediate
level is responsible for appointment of teachers and principals, as well as for disciplinar>'
issues. The intermediate level is now the most important level and it is in fact the
organizing authority of the public school. The central level performs a supervisory
task.-^-^
The statute became effective officially on April 1, 1999, but it will take until 2003
for every school to be adapted." The statute emphasizes the importance of local
involvement, a concept that had never existed before in the Belgian public school
tradition.
The public school has to provide religiously and politically neutral education. For
its own purpose, the public schools provide an education and vocational training for its
teachers. Before 1998, there was an affirmative action policy for teachers who were a
product of the public school system. Up to three-fourths could be hired from its of the
"own public school system"". Thus it was permissible to ask where they had received
-
' R. Verstegen, L. Veny, W. Rauws and D. Deli, Current Questions of Education Law 10
(Kluwer 1997).
^*'* Johan Heyvaert and Guy Janssens, Education Pocket 1 7 (Kluwer Editorial) ( 1 998).
'*^Wat 18.
'''Id
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their education. This policy no longer exists. Some authors even that it is against the
TOT
freedom of education clause to ask whether the future teacher went to a public school."
1 . Employment Contract
Generally, in order to teach in the public school system, a person needs the
necessary degrees just as for the private school system. The statutes enacted in 1991
equate the requirements for both school types. Since the public school is a public
service, it cannot have any preferences in hiring. A person who meets all the
requirements cannot be rejected by the public school.
The system of application for a position in the public school system differs from
the private school. While candidates for a private school position need to take the step
towards applying to each school where they want to work, for the public school, a central
call-up is done to all candidates.
But the system is basically the same as in the private school otherwise. First, the
teacher will start his career in a temporary status. But when he has acquired enough
seniority and positive evaluations, he will acquire tenure.
In fact, public school teachers are public employees, which means that they have
to obey a set of rules that do not exist in the private employment relationship. It has been
highly debated what kind of relationship the state had with its workers. Some
commentators have tried to apply as many elements from private employment as
possible, though there are significant differences between a public employee and a
private employee. Since public employees are not hired on the basis of a contract, but
rather are nominated by the state, it has been impossible to equate them to private
employees. The fact that public employers are nominated by the employer was seen as a
" R. Verstegen, The Education Law in Flanders. An Overview 21(Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen 1997).
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privilege as in the United States." This resuhed in a restricted freedom. Issues such as
religious accommodation of the employer, freedom of speech, especially whistle-
blowing, were not allowed for public employees. In Belgium too. a change in the case
law resulted in more rights for public employees, such as the right to unionize and to
strike. However, one major difference between the private school teacher and the public
school teacher is in the area of tort liability.
2. Unions
The right of public employees to unionize has always been considered a
constitutional right. Yet, as in the United States, the right to strike has been non-existent
for public employees for a long times, because the right to work as a public employee
was considered a privilege. Thus it was impossible for a public employee to strike. This
does not comport with the reality. The view of public employment as privilege began to
fade because working conditions were not as good as in the private sector and the wages
were not as high as in private employment. Public employees began to engage in strikes
and were never sanctioned by the courts for this. This precipitated consultations between
the Minister of Education and the unions on an informal level. These informal
consultations have contributed to the way collective bargaining is conducted today in the
public schools.
These informal relations are now regulated by statute. Unions must be
represented in order to join the bargaining. At the Minister's level, unions and legislature
try to enter into collective bargaining. This bargaining can result in statutory
amendments, which the Minister is authorized to make. The economic situation,
however, resulted in a considerable loss of bargaining power on the part of the unions.
"*^ 5ee Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor & City of New Bedford. 29N.E. 517 (1892).
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Strikes are no longer a threat to the decision-makers. The primary concern of all the
unions became the increase ofjobs, since the Belgian State has a high number of
unemployed teachers. Today, there is less bargaining, and more consultation between all
the involved parties. Any change in the statute regulating the status of the teachers in the
public school affects all teachers, whether they are unionized or not.
G. Employee liability
Liability in Belgium has almost the same significance as in the United States: "it
is a broad legal term of the most comprehensive significance, including almost every
character of hazard or responsibility, absolute, contingent, or likely"." Civil liability, as
opposed to the criminal liability, can be divided into two main parts. "'^' There is
contractual liability, which is all claims related to the execution of a contract, whether
performance of the duties agreed upon or the damages. There is also liability, outside the
context of a contract, and outside the scope of criminal law." " This liability is called the
extra-contractual or quasi-delictual liability. It is a liability that establishes an obligation
to do something, to refrain from doing something or to pay. without the existence of a
contract. But it creates this obligation only when a number of conditions are satisfied:
there must be some wrongful conduct, not necessarily unlawful; there must be some
damage, and a causal connection between the damage and the wrongful conduct. The
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, and he must establish the three elements. If he fails to
do so, no damage will be awarded, because the judge will not infer one of the elements
by the existence of the other two.
-*' Wet syndicaal statuut [Statute Regulating the Unions] of December 19, 1974.
-"^ Black's Law Dictionary 63 1 (6* ed. 1990).
"'" Criminal liability means all acts that can give rise to a prosecution. LUDO CORNELIS, PRINCIPLES OF
BELGIAN Tort Law 8 (Bruylant Maklu ed.) ( 1 990).
''"
II Henri De Page. Traite elementaire de droit civil belge [Elementary Treaty upon Belgian
Civil LAW](Bruylant ed. 3th ed.)[hereinafter Belgian Civil Law].
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The basis for extra-contractual damages lies in the Civil Code (C.Civ.). Article
1382 C.Civ. is the general rule pertaining to wrongful conduct and states "[e]vcry act,
committed by a person, that causes damage to someone, obliges the author of this act to
repair the damage"."'^"' This general text provides that active conduct as well as
negligence, carelessness, or recklessness may be a basis for an unlawful act.
The basis for every claim, whatever the quality of the wrongdoer, rest on the
notion of fault. The concept of fault was developed under case law and it consists of
three elements: the wrongdoer must be accountable, he must have broken a general duty
of care, and there must be foreseeable damage." The judge must determine whether all
these elements are present and proven. The latter element is usually deducted from the
existence of the first two elements. To verify the accountability, case law has determined
that a person must have the "ability of distinguishment". This means that a person must
be able to judge the consequences of his deeds. Accountability, when children are
involved, is more difficult to judge. The judge will determine this accountability in his
sole discretion. Usually, the age at which children are able to distinguish is set by the
courts set at age seven. But this is not a binding rule."^^ Thus, the judge must always test
the facts at stake. It is not possible to assume accountability from the mere fact that a
wrongful conduct and damage, caused by this conduct exist." ^ The judge must
determine where the child is able to foresee the consequences of what he is doing, apart
from whether the child has reached the age of ability to distinguish. A totally unforeseen
Code Civ. [C.Civ.], art. 1 382. Tout fait quelconque de rhomme, qui cause a autrui un dommage, oblige
celui par la faute duquel il est arrive, a le reparer.
'^*
L. VENY, ACTUALIA INZAK.E ONDERWIJSAANSPRAKEL1JK.HEID in CURRENT QUESTIONS OF EDUCATION
Law 31 (Kluwer 1997).
-^' LUDO CORNELIS, PRINCIPLES OF BELGIAN TORT LAW 27 (Bruylant Maklu ed.) ( 1 990).
-'^'' Cass. October 30, 1980.
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incident makes that person lose control of their acts. In such a case, the wrongdoer will
not be accountable for his deeds.
The second and most important element of fault is the violation of a general duty
of care. Almost all litigation will deal with a discussion of whether the person who
caused the damage violated this general duty of care. In order to determine whether a
violation exists, the assessment will be abstract.
"'^^ The conduct will be compared to
conduct of a reasonable and prudent man, placed in the same circumstances." The
notion of a reasonable and prudent man refers to an absolutely neutral notion, neither the
personnel qualifications, nor age, gender or experience of the author will play a role."^"^
Only one exception is allowed; when the defender's qualifications exceed those of a
normally prudent and reasonable person, then the conduct will be compared to that of a
normally prudent and reasonably person of that same category.
^°°
Every infringement of the general rule of care creates a fault, whatever the gravity
of the infringement. It is not enough for the plaintiff to prove that the wrongdoer was
accountable and violated the general rule of care. The plaintiff should also prove that at
the moment the incident occurred, the violation of the general rule of care made it
predictable that damage was bound to occur."*^' This is distinct from the will to inflict
damage. Usually a reasonable and prudent person adapts his conduct to the
circumstances in order to avoid any damage. But in reality, the question of whether
"'' Hugo Vandenberghe and Marc Van Quickenbome, Aamprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad [Liability
From Wrongful Act] 4 TlJDSCHRlFT VOOR Privaatrecht [T.P.R.] 1115(1 995) [hereinafter Liability From
Wrongful Act].
-"* Cass. June 30. 1983.
~
"* Hugo Vandenberghe and Marc Van Quickenbome, Liability- From Wrongful Act 4 T.P.R. 1115. 1 126
(1995f.
^"'^ Cass. April 19, 1976.
^'^' Hugo Vandenberghe and Marc Van Quickenbome, Liability' From Wrongful Act 4 T.P.R. 1115. 1438
(1995)^
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damage could have been foreseen will often rise when an act causes damage, so that the
actor may not have been aware of the likelihood of damage occurring.
Thus, three elements must be present: the fault, the damage, which must be
established and proven, and the causality between the damage and the fault.
Tort liability does not have to be based solely on wrongful conduct. There is also
liability based on a presumption of liability. " This means that the liability of a certain
person is presumed, because of his person's status. Such a presumption of liability exists
for parents and teachers. This presumption is to give the victim better chances to repair
the damage. Yet this presumption of liability is refutable. However, the parent or
teacher cannot refute the presumption on the basis that the parent or the teacher
committed no wrongful action. Instead, the presumption must be refuted on the basis that
the damage was a sudden, unforeseeable event.
Article 1384, section 2 of the Civil Code stipulates that the two parents equally
are liable for the damage caused by their minor children. The grounds for the liability of
the parents are that the child committed a wrongful action, which caused damage to an
innocent third party. Only the father and the mother can be held responsible. *^"* Any
child who has not reached the age of majority" ^ falls under the responsibility of its
parents. The parents are liable for the wrongful actions of their children. Once this
wrongful conduct is established, the parents are presumed to be liable. They can only
refute this liability by invoking the sudden character of what the child did, and which
they could not be expected to have prevented.
^°- LUDO CORNELis, PRINCIPLES OF BELGIAN TORT LAW 3 1 7 (Bruvlant Maklu ed.) ( 1 990).
'"'Wat 318.
^°"' Hugo Vandenberghe and Marc Van Quickenbome, Liabilitv From Wrongful Act 4 T.P.R. 1115, 1371
(1995).
^"^ The age of majority in Belgium is 18.
79
Since the wrongful conduct of the child is the same as the wrongful conduct under
the general rules of liability, the victim must prove that the three elements exist: fault.
damage and causal connection between the damage and the wrongful conduct. The
assessment of fault consists of the three-prong test, which does not differ from the
general rules of liability. Yet the question of accountability is more important in the
context of presumed liability. The child must have the ability of distinguishment. If the
judge comes to the conclusion, that the child did not reach this ability, the child will not
be declared accountable. This leads to the result that there is no fault, and thus, no
liability is established. The victim can recover damages from neither the child nor the
parents. This seems rather harsh for the victim, and some courts immediately inquire as
to whether there has been an infringement of the general rule of care and duty. Only
third parties can claim for damages. Parents who are victims of the wrongful conduct of
their children fall outside the scope of the application of this rule. The responsibility
rests upon the parents" quality as parents, not on the question of whether a parent guards
the child.
The presumption of a parent's liability for the child embraces two elements. First,
it presumes that the parents committed a fault, either in the surveillance of their child, or
in the education of the child. Parents can try to be discharged from the liability by
showing that they committed no fault in the surveillance or the education. If they fail to
show this, it does not mean that they really made such a mistake, since the mechanism of
liability works on the basis of a presumption. ^*^^
^"^ LUDO CORNELIS, PRINCIPLES OF BELGIAN TORT LAW 325 (Bruvlant Maklu ed.) (1990).
This caused no problem during a long time. However since the increased number of divorces, where a
child usually lives with one parent, one might think that the other parent, victim, might recover damages,
quod non.
'"* Hugo Vandenberghe and Marc Van Quickenbome, Liability From Wrongful Act 4 T.P.R. 1115, 1373
(1995)^
80
It is not only parents who bear this presumption of Hability. The same article
1384, section 4 of the Civil Code states that teachers and craftsmen are also responsible
for their pupils during the time they are under the surveillance of the teacher or
craftsman. This liability is similar to that of the parents. Similarly the teachers and
craftsmen can exonerate themselves from liability by proving that they could not avoid
the incident.^^^ There has to be some wrongful conduct, committed by a pupil, that
caused damage to a third party, while the pupil was under the surveillance of the teacher.
This article of the Civil Code, since it was drafted in 1804, especially the section
applicable to teachers, is outdated. In Belgium, as well in the Dutch and the French
language, an extra term exists to describe an elementary school teacher. The article of
the Civil Code uses the word "teacher"" (onderwijzer) in the sense of a teacher of an
elementary school, instead of the general word (leraar). There is no discussion about
whether this article applies to all school teachers, from elementary school to high
school. ^"^ In fact, the entire school staff falls under the term "'teacher"".^" Thus a
teacher, while not teaching, but at school, apparently is subject to this presumption.
Unlike parental presumption of liability, teacher and craftsmen responsibility does not
stop once the student reaches the age of the majority. The fact that a person is at school
and is receiving an education makes this person a student. This means that the
presumption of liability exists not only in the classroom, but also in the hallways, the
recreation area, the cafeteria, wherever students are allowed. When a student withdraws
"°'^ JOHAN HEYVAERT AND GUY JaNSSENS, EDUCATION POCKET 374 (Kluwer Editorial)( 1 998).
^'° Hugo Vandenberghe and Marc Van Quickenbome, Liability From Wrongful Act 4 T.P.R. 1115, 1372
(1995).
^" Even the principal of a school falls under the notion of teacher. See L. Veny, Actualia INZAKE
ONDERW1JSAANSPRAKELUK.HE1D in CURRENT QUESTIONS OF EDUCATION LAW 71 (Kluwer 1997).
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from the premises, there is no further hability on the teacher.^'" It is no defense that the
student was not accountable for his acts.
When the victim establishes that the damage was caused by a student under the
surveillance of the teacher, the teacher can attempt to refute the presumption of liability.
This presumption of liability is often equated with fault, surveillance by the teacher.'' In
reality, however, it means that the burden of proof may be reversed. Indeed, the teacher
must establish that his surveillance was sufficient. The surveillance is declared
sufficient when the damage occurred while the teacher performed his task amply and it
was impossible to prevent the act of the student's actions. This impossibility must relate
to the fact that either the teacher could not foresee the act of the student, or that the
teacher was not present, and the teacher's absence was legitimate. "^
For at least for a centur>'. courts had separated the presumption of liability of
parents and the teachers. ^ Once under the surveillance of the teacher, the teacher was
the sole and only person responsible for the conduct of the child. The parents were not
then subject to this presumption of liability. But an argument made by teachers was that
students did not tend to listen to them. This argument became more vociferous over the
years, and it was even common for reprimanded students to be defended by their parents.
Many teachers felt this presumption of liability was a cumbersome and unfair burden.
Another argument was that judges did not know what the reality was, and that it was easy
to }udge postfactem what a teacher was supposed to do. Judges seemed not to
^'- LUDO CORNELIS, PRINCIPLES OF BELGIAN TORT LAW 359 (Bruylant Maklu ed.) (1990).
^'^ LUDO CORNELIS, PRINCIPLES OF BELGIAN TORT LAW 360 (Bruvlant Maklu ed.) ( 1 990).
^'^ L. VENY, ACTUALIA INZAK.E ONDERWIJSAANSPRAK.ELIJKHEID in CURRENT QUESTIONS OF EDUCATION
LAW73(Kluwer 1997).
^'^ JoHAN Heyvaert AND Guy Janssens, Education Pocket 374 (Kluwer Editorial) (1998).
^'^ LUDO CORNELIS, PRINCIPLES OF BELGIAN TORT LAW 360 (Bruylant Maklu ed.) (1990).
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understand that a teacher did not have one single student under his surveillance, but
sometimes thirtv'. forty or more.
It has only been recently that the Court de Cassation changed its \ iew."'^ although
many commentators do not mention this reverse in case law. Until 1 989. the courts
had stated that in case of presumption of liability, responsibility of one party excludes the
responsibility of the other party. '"^ Until that time, the lower courts were split. Some
courts recognized the possibility of a claim against both parents and teachers, while
others recognized only exclusive alternative claims. But no rule in the Civil Code
prohibits the joint application of liability. Hence, the presumption of parental liability is
based on a fault in the surveillance or a fault in the education. Presumption of teacher
liability is based on the presumption that there was an improper surveillance. In 1 989,
the Cour the Cassation reversed a longstanding tradition in accepting that indeed, one
presumption of responsibility does not exclude the other. The court held that the
responsibility of the parents is based upon "either a fault in the education or a fault in the
surveillance".^" It deducted from this holding that "the existence of both faults together
is not necessary"."^"' It means that the Court considers certain deeds of the student while
under surveillance of the teacher to be rooted in a lack of education on the part of the
parents.
^'^Cass. Februar>'23, 1989.
^'*5ee JOHAN Heyvaert AND Guy Janssens, Education Pocket 375 (Kluwer Editorial) (1998).
Except for the fact that the teacher and the parent are the same person. See LUDO CORNELIS,
Principles of Belgian Tort Law 365 (Bruylant Maklu ed.) ( 1 990).
The original text goes as following: "soit sur une faute dans I'education, soit sur une faute dans la
surveillance". Cass. February 23, 1989.
The original text goes as following: "que I'existence des deux fautes n'est pas necessaire". Id.
83
It remains an open question whether this will be a breakthrough in the tort law.
Some commentators continue to cite the older case law. ~~ while the majority of
commentators do not even mention this change in the case law. "
Apart from the presumption of liability for the wrongful conduct of the children,
teachers have been held liable for their own wrongful personal actions. Both case law
and legal commentators consider every omission, every recklessness, every ignorance,
every rashness, every omission to take measures, imposed by the circumstances to be a
fault of a teacher.^""^ The most striking examples are those of a teacher hitting a student.
or leaving a student unattended, or even allowing the students to play dangerous games
on the playground."" The victim must prove a damage, which can consist of material or
moral damage. The material damage consists of any damage that either hurts the
physical integrity of the person or produces a loss. It includes any damage that is
countable and repairable through the payment of money.
Moral damages in Belgium are not awarded as they are in the U.S. and they do
not command a high sum."" Moral damages are considered a loss of an immaterial thing
and not a countable good. It can consist of pain, caused through wounds and injuries, a
reduction of work ability, and sometimes injury to the reputation of a person.
H. Employer liability
The Civil Code regulates the general rules for liability. It also establishes a range
of duties, either through presumptions attributed to persons or because of an objective
^" JOHAN HEYVAERT AND GUY JaNSSENS. EDUCATION POCKET 374 (Kluvver Editorial) ( 1 998).
^"' See L. Veny. Actualia inzake onderwijsaansprakelukheid in Current Questions of
Education Law (Kluwer 1997).
"^ JOHAN HEYVAERT AND GuY Janssens, EDUCATION POCKET 370 (Kluwer Editorial) (1998).
'-^
Id. at 375.
'"^ Hugo Vandenberghe and Marc Van Quickenbome, Liability From Wrongful Act 4 T.P.R. 1115, 1470
(1995).
"-'' JOHAN HEYVAERT AND GUY JANSSENS, EDUCATION POCKET 371 (Kluwer Editorial) (1998).
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responsibility, which means that the person to whom the duty will be attributed cannot
refute it. Since the creation of the Civil Code, society underwent major changes. This
has led to more numerous and complex statutes. Some of these deal with liability. They
complement the principles of the Civil Code, but they do not change its basic notions.
The liability of the employer for its employee is a very important concept. It is
based upon the principle of hiring someone to do work. The instructor, i.e. the person on
whose behalf the hired person works, will be held responsible in case the subordinate
commits a wrongful act within the course of employment. " The victim does not need to
establish the existence of a persormel fault. Since this responsibility is irrefutable, the
instructor could not try to reverse the burden of proof by showing that his care or
surveillance was sufficient to prevent the damage from happening. This principle is
found in the Civil Code and also in the statute that regulates the relationship between the
employee and the employer.^"
It is in this area that the discussion of the characteristics of the relationship
between the teacher in a private school and the organizing authority loses its
philosophical character. Different solutions to the problem of the character of this
relationship would create different regimes of liability, since the public employee follows
another rule. In fact, the private school teacher, working under an employment contract,
receives greater protection, because his employer is subject to objective liability.
But although the private employee receives a certain protection under the statute,
he will not be exonerated completely from any liability. The statute stipulates that the
employee, while performing the employment contract, is liable for fraud, a serious fault,
•' LUDO CORNELIS. PRINCIPLES OF BELGIAN TORTS LAW 381 (Bruylanl Maklu ed.) ( 1 990).
^-^ Statute Regulating the Employment Contracts from June 14, 1978.
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or a light fault if it is a habit for the fault to happen. ^^^ The employee must have
committed the act while performing the duties of his employment. According to Belgian
law, this means that the employee is under the authority, control and surveillance of his
employer. There must exist a relationship of subordination. It is this subordination that
constitutes an employee - employer relationship. The coverage of the statute and the
criteria for personal responsibility on the basis of this statute are only because the act
falls within the scope of the employment. In reality, the judge will look at the opposite:
when or what did the employer do to fall outside the range of a normal performance of
the employment contract. It will always rest on the facts. Furthermore, the scope of the
employment contract is usually rather widely interpreted. Whenever the acts where
committed intentionally or with recklessness (which constitutes a major fault) it is likely
that the employee will fall outside the scope of the contract. As a consequence, his
conduct will not be covered by the statute. Whenever there is no personal liability of the
employee, the employer is. by virtue of the statute liable for his employee's acts. This
means that third parties can recover from the employer when the employee inflicts
damage to the third party. However, this statute will not affect any criminal liability of
the employee.
At first sight, there may not appear to be much of a difference between a public
school and a private school. Both schools are created, the public school by the
legislature, the private school by private persons and exist as distinct corporations, apart
from their creators. Those corporations act as every other person, subject to the law.
They can enter contracts, buy property, enjoy rights and owe duties as every other person
within the state.
^^°/<:/., art. 18.
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Yet in Belgium, the law has always distinguished between private employees and
public employees. Not only is the relationship between a public employee and his
employer different from that of a private employee with his employer, the coverage for
tort liability is also different. Because public school teachers are considered public
employees, they have a different tort liability coverage than their counterparts in the
private school.
This difference has its basis in governmental immunity. Courts did not consider
themselves competent to condemn the state, because of the separation of powers. It was
only in 1920 that the courts recognized a possibility of liability for the state. The court
made a distinction between the administration, acting as a public corporation and as a
private person. When the corporation acts as a private person, there should be no reason
to exonerate any liability." Through the years, the courts went a little further in each
case. For instance, one case stipulated that the corporation's decision itself had to be free
of any negligence. ^^" It is clear now that the state and its agents are no longer immune
from tort liability.
Although state agencies, such as a public school board, and its employees can be
held liable and are subject to the same general rules of tort liability as private persons, the
mechanism works differently than for other corporations or employees. Agencies can
only act through the persons that administer them. These persons are the organs of the
agency. Organs exist for private as well as for public corporations, and they act on behalf
of the corporation. However, the major difference between the private and the public
corporation is its mission. Public corporations provide a service to the population. This
service can at all times be revoked, changed, enlarged or diminished. This mission can
"' LUDO CORNELIS, PRINCIPLES OF BELGIAN TORT LAW 208 (Bruylant Maklu ed.) ( 1 990).
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either be changed by the same legislature that created the corporation, or that legislature
may decide to delegate some of its power to the corporation, so that it can decide for
itself.
An organ can be held liable, solely or together with its agency. In order to have
joint liability, the victim must prove that the person who inflicted the damage was the
organ at the moment the damage occurred and that the organ acted within the boundaries
of its function. ^^^ The victim has the choice, and does not have to sue the organ and the
agency together. When the victim decides to recover only from the organ, the organ
cannot require the agency to appear at the trial. The organ may be held solely
responsible, even for the slightest fault.
Public school teachers are considered organs."'^ It is difficult to understand why
they are seen as such, because an organ is more than a public employee. An organ
usually has the power to bind the agency, something a teacher cannot do. For teachers,
the insulation of employer liability is absent. It is difficult to reason why case law
developed this distinction between teachers from the private and from the public schools,
since the essence of their jobs is similar, if not the same. Also, the general rules and
presumption of liability apply to the private school teachers as well as to public school
teachers.
Many commentators have criticized the distinction that case law has made,
because the teachers' work is the same, regardless of the public or private character of the
school. ^ The sole difference is that in one case, the teacher falls under a burdensome
"- Cass. April 23, 1971.
334
LUDOCORNELIS, PRINCIPLES OF BELGIAN TORT LAW 455 (Bmylant Maklu ed.)(1990).
Contrast this to the employee, whose employer is liable for the slightest fault. The employee is only
personal liable for fraud, intent, heavy fault, such as reckless, or a light but habitual fault.
^"^ LUDO CORNELIS, PRINCIPLES OF BELGIAN TORT LAW 455 (Bruylant Maklu ed.) ( 1 990).
"^/c/. at 461.
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regime of liability whereas, in the other case, the teacher is insulated by the employer. In
19Q8. the Constitutional Court considered this distinction to be unconstitutional under the
rationale that the Belgian Constitution guarantees the principle of equality. liul it is
questionable whether the Cour de Cassation, which is a different court, is willing to
accept that its construction is erroneous. In general, it is understandable that such a
distinction exists; some organs of corporations have a great deal of delegated power, such
as mayors, district attorneys and judges. There must be some sort of ground for the
victim to recover for wrongful conduct. However, teachers do not have that extent of
delegated power. They can make binding decisions, such as grading, failing a student
and holding that student back, or expelling him temporarily from the classroom.' '^ Yet.
there is no need to equate teachers with high position organs. Case law demonstrates that
there is a valid alternative: amend the statute regulating the liability of the public school
teacher.
""^ JOHAN HEYVAERT AND GUY JaNSSENS, EDUCATION POCKET 37 1 (Kluwer Editorial) (1998).
Conclusion
At first blush, there appear to be huge differences between the educational
systems of the United States and Belgium. The first difference lies in the legal tradition.
One might think that therefore, the status of teachers in the two countries would be
completely different. However, at second blush, the differences between the two systems
are not as great as they first appear.
It is a commonly thought in Europe that the law of the United States is less
codified than it is in Belgium. But depending on how one defines the term
"codification", this might be incorrect. If one understands the term as the process of
enacting a statute where all the aspects of one particular matter are combined, then
indeed, there seems to be more codification in Belgium than in the United States. But the
term embraces more than that. If instead, codification is the process of collecfing and
arranging laws in a systematic order, regardless of whether in a statute or in case law then
the codification of school law is much more comprehensive in the United States than in
Belgium. In Belgium, apart from the statutes, it is hard to find any systematic treatise or
any systematic compilation that deals with the issue of school law. Many authors write
about the principle of freedom of education, or what the nature of the employment
contract is to the teacher in the private school, but until recently, no author has devoted
an entire book to the subject.
'-'^SeeW. at 15.
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In the United States, the issue seems to have attracted much more attention, since
there is not only more case law. but also commentators seem to be more interested in a
systematic codification of law addressing the troublesome problems.
The principle of freedom of education is present in both countries to roughly the
same extent. Both countries must deal with advocates of a state education and advocates
of a private, religiously inspired school system. Both countries allow a co-existence of
the two systems. The financing of public schools is somewhat different between the two
countries, although it seems that both countries have considered all the possible ideas for
financing. In the United States, a controversial system of vouchers for private school
education was considered. This has yet to be introduced in Belgium. ^"*° But both
countries adhere strongly to the concept that schools have to be free, especially public
schools. In order to guarantee the right of absolute freedom of choice, parents must also
be given a choice of sending their children to private schools. In Belgium, the legislature
guarantees this freedom of choice through financing of the private school system as well
as the public school system. This may give rise to the question of whether this is not an
unconstitutional entanglement of state and religion, since the funding for private schools
occurs through use of public tax revenue.
Private schools in both countries have more freedom to hire employees, although
in both countries, the law seems to require that the schools, in imposing certain
philosophical requirements on the teachers, must leave space for the teacher's private
life.
"'^ See Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School Law (West 3"^ Ed.), H.
C. Hudgings, jr. & Richard S. Vacca, Law and Education, Contemporary issues and Court
Decisions 163 (The Michie Company 3 rd Ed.), Michael W. LaMorte, School Law Cases and
Concepts (Allvn and Bacon ed. 6* ed.) (1998).
'''Id.
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In Belgium, the official school system appears to have to meet a heavier burden
than the private schools, because the official school system must provide a neutral
education and thus must restrain from requiring loyalty to its own system. The Belgian
private school system, on the other hand, receives strong public subsidies, yet the
individual schools can follow their particular ideology. Apparently, the private schools
are no longer entitled to ask its future teachers where they received their education.
Thus, teachers who are not the product of a particular educational system cannot be
discriminated against.
The teacher's employment contracts in the two countries seem to be different on
the surface, but after scrutinizing these contracts, more similarities exist than one might
first think. Basically, the employment contracts in the private schools of the two
countries are similar. For both countries, the employment at-will doctrine controls. In
the United States, employment contracts are generally construed through case law,
whereas in Belgium it is done through statutory interpretation. The protections for
teachers are historically greater in Belgium than in the United States.
Tort liability is also very similar under the two systems. Case law in the United
States uses the construction of in loco parentis, and in Belgium basically the same exists.
It also seems that in both countries there is a trend towards accepting the general feeling
that teachers are doing a good job and that although they can make mistakes, they do not
have to be super human beings. In earlier times, in Belgium, teachers seemed to be
judged harshly, whereas recently, judges seem to accept that being a teacher is an
important job. Case law currently seems to favor the teachers.
' R. Verstegen, The Education Law in Flanders. An Overview 21(Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen 1997).
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The Belgium school system has undergone major changes in the past few years.
It has been assumed was that the Minister of Education admired the American
educational system and that this admiration perhaps may have influenced the changes in
the Belgium system. Given the similarities between the two systems, this may well be
true.
^f o,r-:^(Q
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